330 
we have no explanation at all. The weak point of all Mate- 
rialism lies just in this^ that with this explanation it stops short 
at the very point where the highest problems of philosophy 
begin [id., p. 30). Man himself is_, so far as our experience 
extends^ the highest product of the universe. Is it rational, — 
is it possible, — to regard him as the effect of something 
destitute itself of mind and consciousness ? Can the effect be 
more and greater than the originating cause ? It may, indeed, 
be less, but can it, I repeat, be greater ? Just in this point 
lies the vast advantage of those who, in any form, hold to the 
doctrine of an originating mind. On either side an assumption 
simply stupendous, — for the moment let me call it an assump- 
tion, — must be made when we endeavour to account for this 
stupendous universe, of which we form a part. Some one, 
perhaps, will interject. But why endeavour to account for it? 
The question is foreign to our immediate purpose ; but I reply, 
in passing, because we cannot help attempting. The problem 
of existence is thrust upon us. We are, and know there w^as a 
time when we were not. We know ourselves to be the effects 
of an unknown power. Not to suppose a cause is simply a 
thing impossible. Some cause of all things, — that which I just 
now called an assumption,^^ — is, then, no assumption, but a 
belief, which is inevitable. The belief of the Theist is in a 
Being not less than man, but immeasurably greater, who of 
the fulness of his life has given us a portion. The first cause 
of the Materialist is matter in motion, — nothing more, — and I 
ask again is such a cause of things conceivably adequate to 
the production of the known effects ? Can we so explain to 
ourselves our own rational existence? We have seen mate- 
rialistic explanation brought to a stand before the phenomenon 
of mere organic life. How can it deal with the fact of con- 
scious personal existence ? Have I, then, no meaning when I 
say, I AM ? Let us ask ourselves that question, for it is in 
vain to argue with those who will not face it. Then, are we, 
in deference to supposed deductions from physical experience, 
to give the lie to that inner consciousness which tells us that 
we are other than, and more than, the material organism to 
which our life is for the time inexplicably bound ; that the 
mind of man is not his brain, nor his life, the sum of the mere 
vital forces which are its perishable instruments ? Can we, 
indeed, believe that saint and sage, philosopher and poet ; the 
play of fancy, the method of reason, the struggles of the Will, the 
warnings of the Conscience, with all that belongs to the abysmal 
deeps of Personality ; all the drama of history ; all the passion 
of life ; are, as this pseudo-science pretends to teach us, the 
mere outcome and expression of molecular change, all products 
