339 
and an irrational theory, with a hint also (at the end of the paper) that it is 
at least, likely to become an immoral theory. 
The danger to which the writer alludes (p. 322) of “ persons unused to philo- 
sophical inquiries ” being misled by the fascinations of scientific discovery 
into an acceptance of the dicta of scientists concerning “ causation,” as if they 
were “ scientific,” and therefore trustworthy, is, I believe, a very real danger. 
The fact is, that w^hen we begin to speak of causes, “ originant ” forces, 
“ organific ” forces, “ conscious sensation,” and the like, we leave the pro- 
vince of (what is now, by a limitation of the term, called) “ science,” and 
become perforce metaiohyncians, i.e. philosophisers about the non-sensuous 
or super-sensuous. 
And philosophy, if it is to be anything more than negative scepticism or 
a suicidal process of reasoning, must admit both mental and material pheno- 
mena to be factors in the mighty problem which philosophy is ever 
endeavouring to solve. This granted, let men push ‘‘ sensationalist ” or 
idealist ” notions as far as they may, we are driven at last to the ultimate 
question. What is the “ productive power, though unrevealed to sense,” 
which “ must be sought for behind the things produced ” ? Three answers 
are possible : (1) That of the Materialist jpro^er, I believe that from Matter 
everything is evolved ; (2) that of the Theist, I believe that Mind must be 
the originating force ; (3) that of the Agnostic, I do not know. Which 
answer, then, is most reasonable when we take all the facts into considera- 
tion ? Is it to say with Lange, “The motion of the atoms is sensation ” ? 
(p. 8), or to adopt Prof. Clifford’s doctrine of mind-stuff, and thus by a 
glaring jpetitio prmcipii invalidate all after-display of logical acumen ? Is 
it not far more reasonable to say (the ultimate question being, we remember, 
a “ dynamical ” one), that our highest notion of productive power, i.e. the 
notion of Mind and Will, must be connected with the primary super- 
sensuous cause of all motion and energy ? 
But the Agnostic steps in, and says, “You cannot know this inscrutable 
Power.” Now there is, be it remembered, an ambiguity in the use of this 
word “know.” The Theist, and those who recognise the Bible as the book 
of highest authority in religious matters, will, to a certain extent, concur 
with those who say God is inscrutable, or “unknowable.” (Psalmists, 
Prophets, and Apostles, might be cited as intimating that God’s ways are 
“ past tracing out.”) But is there not a real, though incomplete, knowledge 
of the supra-human, supra-material causative power attainable by philo- 
sophical faith ? I mean that faith, which is the rational issue of the exercise 
of our mental powers upon “ metaphysical ” questions, — questions which, as 
Mr. Kichmond clearly reminds us, are inseparably associated with the 
why ” and the “ how ” to which (physical) scientists can give no answer 
while acting within their own province ; for “ the knowledge of a producing 
cause is beyond the scope of science.” The passage in the paper (p. 330), 
“ Man himself .... without knowledge ” admirably puts before us the 
necessity of belief in some primary cause, and the advantage of the belief 
of the Theist over that of the Materialist. 
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