113 
death itself. If we are not entitled to assume that the world 
is designed with consummate wisdom,* we are at least, I 
presume, justified in saying that the wisdom and goodness, as 
well as the power, with which it is contrived and kept in being, 
is somewhat in advance of these qualities, as they are found 
even in the highest and best human intellect. But a very 
ordinary human intellect would revolt at the injustice of im- 
planting in man a conviction, or even of permitting a conviction 
to be almost universally prevalent, which was to him a source 
of delusive happiness and comfort. This is the case with the 
belief in immortality, which has existed in man in all ages, 
and under all conditions. If, with the late Professor Clifford, 
we ascribe this belief to the desire to live, we merely remove 
the difficulty a step. The world is not only ill, but very ill 
ordered, if a desire for life, so deep and unquenchable that it 
must needs cheat itself, always and everywhere, with such a 
figment of the imagination, is implanted in human nature only 
to be denied. Grant immortality, and you at once reconcile the 
difficulty of death with the goodness apparent elsewhere. Deny 
it, and you at once assume a cruelty for which no temporary 
favours bestowed on humanity can compensate. Even the death 
of animals, one of the greatest difficulties in the way of a belief 
in immortality, may best be explained in accordance with the 
phenomena of visible existence by supposing that the gift of 
life is only resumed, not destroyed ; and it is by no means 
unreasonable to suppose that it may afterwards be manifested 
in other forms. f 
28. Another argument for the belief that God is knowable 
is derived from the fact of conscience. This, Professor Clifford 
tells us, is the “ experience of the tribe.” But we have to deal 
with the fact that the “ experience of the tribe,” — that is to 
* J. Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion, p. 58. 
t Theodore Parker {Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 198) 
cannot reconcile the idea of perfect benevolence in God with the idea of 
the mortality of animals, and the absence for them of retribution in another 
life. We have certainly better reasons for believing in the beneficence of 
God than for erecting the mortality of animals, a point on which we know 
nothing, into an article of faith. But the evidences we have of the bene- 
volence of the Creator might surely be enough to induce us to trust Him, 
as reasonable men certainly would trust a fellow-creature who had given 
similar evidences of benevolence, in a case which is beyond our criteria of 
judging. Mr. Parker’s words are worth notice : “ I do not pretend to 
know how this is brought about” ( i.e ., the disciplinary effect of pain leading 
to ultimate welfare) ; “ I know not the middle terms which intermediate 
between the misery I see and the blessedness I imagine. I only know that 
the ultimate welfare must come to the mutilated beast overtasked by some 
brutal man.” 
