137 
THE AUTHOR’S REPLY. 
I have thought it best to substitute a written reply for that which I 
delivered on the evening of the discussion. This I do, partly because the 
lateness of the hour obliged me to curtail what I wished to say, and partly 
because the observations I then made were rather supplementary to my 
paper than in reply to the speeches delivered, which, as a rule, though 
dealing with the subject at the head of the paper, had very little con- 
nexion with the paper itself. 
In the few observations which I did make, I put in the forefront a remark 
which fell from Mr. Woods Smith. That gentleman appeared to suppose 
that I had said that God was not infinite. What I actually said was that 
He was not “ the Infinite ” of metaphysics, which is a very different thing.* 
I should regret it much if any reader of my paper who might happen to 
have a slight acquaintance with metaphysical terminology should thus 
misunderstand my language. Perhaps the best way of expressing the 
truth about God in this respect is to adopt the language of the First Article 
of the Church of England, and speak of God as “ of infinite power, wisdom, 
and goodness,” and to remember that with regard to the first of these 
attributes it is limited by the last — God can do nothing which would not 
be consistent with goodness. Could He do so, He would not be good. 
On one other point mentioned by Mr. Woods Smith I may make a remark. 
He laid great stress upon the inward revelation of God, and said that even 
Mr. Spencer admitted that it could take place. An inward revelation of 
God as the “ Unknowable ” would not be of much practical benefit to 
anybody, and therefore (1) Mr. Herbert Spencer’s admission does not 
amount to much ; and (2) Mr. Spencer’s meaning in those words is certainly 
a very different thing from the interpretation Mr. W oods Smith would place 
upon them. The limits of my paper did not allow me to enlarge very much 
on the revelation of God to the inner man. That I did not neglect it, 
paragraph 30 will show. But all inner revelations need to be connected 
by external considerations, or there would be no means of distinguishing 
between religion and fanaticism ; or, rather, objective truth would disappear 
altogether, and that would be truth which each person thought to be so. It 
is very easy to see to what utterly Agnostic conclusions this would lead us. 
The fact is, that, if what we subjectively believe to be truth be really so, it 
# Mill, in his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy , p. 55, speaks 
with some degree of scorn of the “ Infinite ” and “ Absolute,” calling them 
“ meaningless abstractions,” and declaring that they are “ notions contra- 
dictory in themselves, and to which no corresponding realities do or can exist.” 
