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virtually to contain within itself an induction and a deduction, 
arriving at, and returning from, a general probability. Thus 
(in the instance just given) the correctness of the analogy is 
shown by reasoning thus : — This stone falls ; what is true of 
this stone is probably true of all stones, this one being, as far 
as I can see, an adequate representative of the class : if, then, 
all stones will (probably) fall when thrown up, this other stone 
will (probably) do so. The probability is inserted as a modifi- 
cation, because there is no opportunity of testing accurately 
whether the stone in question is an accurate representative 
or not of the whole class. If there were such an opportunity, 
a genuine induction would be the result ; where no testing can 
take place, we must be content with probability. This rapid 
seizing of an analogy, and either working from one to other 
individual cases, or summing all up in one grand induction, 
was not unknown to the Greek logicians, and seems to be 
what is spoken of by Aristotle under the name ayxivoia, or 
nearness of reason. But ay\ivoLa has its dangers. The 
similarity between individuals, which it lays hold of, may be 
in accidentals, and not in essentials, and the real essential 
differences may lie exactly where they are last to meet the 
view. 
The sceptical reasonings relative to the criticism of Scrip- 
ture appear to contain this fallacy. Scripture, it is urged, is 
a written document, and should be subjected to the same 
process of examination as every other writing. Scripture 
history is a collection of legends, and must be interpreted just 
like all other historical legends. If Romulus is a- myth, so is 
Moses ; if the supernatural appears in the battle of Rephidim 
and the battle at the Lake Regillus, it is as incredible in the 
one tale as in the other. Here we have an instance of false 
analogy. Scriptural documents are not like others, because 
they put forth different claims on our belief. Scriptural tales — • 
legends, if you please to call them so, — do not stand on the same 
footing as heathen traditions : they were committed to writing, 
by the confession of their opponents, at a period far earlier 
than that at which any other human records were written, a 
few undeciphered hieroglyphics, perhaps, excepted ; they have 
continued to be accepted and believed by a large number of 
persons, and have been quoted as authentic history, even 
to the present time, while other legends have long been 
relegated to their true place, and though, perhaps, not 
scientifically interpreted, have still not been put forward as 
giving the literal truth. Hence the analogy drawn is false : 
Scriptural stories are not representatives of the class to which 
historical legends belong, nor are the myths of heathenism fairly 
