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that thought may be. His grand aim is to make sure of all 
thought which corresponds with that which is real, and he finds 
that he cannot do this without learning of matter as well as of 
mind, and of mind as well as of matter. To trace, then, the 
relations to which, in this paper, our attention is directed, we 
must look candidly and with deep earnestness into all thought 
of realities which bears upon the doctrine in question. 
By the Christian doctrine of prayer I mean neither more 
nor less in this paper than man’s asking— God’s giving as the 
consequence of that asking — and man’s receiving as the conse- 
quence of that giving. The point of thought specially in view 
is that of God's giving, in consequence of man's asking. Our 
inquiry will virtually be as to whether Metaphysical and 
Physical Science, in their grand results, are consistent with 
this idea of God's acting* in direct and real consequence of 
man's asking*. Ho one who knows the influence of Science on 
the one hand, and of real prayer on the other, will fail to see 
the vast importance of such a subject. It is philosophical, 
yet eminently practical, and even, as “ divines" would say, 
“ experimental." I mean to treat it as almost, if not altogether, 
a subject in philosophy ; yet as one of those many subjects in 
philosophy which necessarily thrust themselves into the domain 
of religion. My aim is to show, how perfectly true Science 
ever bears out true theology and also true life in man. 
In an inquiry like that on which we thus enter, it seems 
necessary to make as sure as may be that we understand the 
true nature of knowledge itself. Science is knowledge, but 
we need to ask what it is ec to know.” This is in itself a vital 
point in metaphysical investigation, and so forms an appro- 
priate introduction to all that follows. The philosophical writer 
whom I have quoted above gives us incidentally one of his 
ideas on this point. Speaking of the inmost nature or essence 
of a thing which he argues “ we cannot know," he says — “ If 
there were such a central property, it would not answer to the 
idea of an ‘ inmost nature,' for, if knowable by any intelli- 
gence, it must, like other properties, be relative to the intel- 
ligence that knows it — that is, it must consist in impressing 
that intelligence in some specific way, for this is the only idea 
we have of knowing; the only sense in which the verb f to 
know ' means anything."* 
I must remark, with great humility, that this is far from 
tolerable English. A property," we are told, “ must consist " 
* Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 14 . Ed. 1866 . 
