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not in an impression, nor in a capability of impressing, but 
in “ impressing ” itself ! A noun must be a verb ! A quality 
must be an act, if not a process ! And tbis strange property , 
or stranger act, is our only idea of knowing ! Tbis unmaster- 
able confusion of words must express tbe only sense by which 
the familiar verb “ to know ” has any meaning ! We can only 
guess that Mr. Mill meant to say, that an impression on the 
intelligence, made in some specific way, is tbe only meaning ol 
knowledge. But is it so ? Would not tbis notion of know- 
ledge, by taking personal activity out oi tbe idea of knowing, 
invert tbe verb “to know?” If that verb does not mean 
something which is mentally done by tbe person who is called 
an "intelligence,” but only an impression which is made upon 
that person, is it not then absurd to say, as every man does when 
be has satisfied bis reason on any point, “ I hnow . _v\ armt 
from an external object is simply an impression which that 
heated object makes upon me ; speaking of that impression 
would it do to say “ I warm ” when tbe whole truth is tnat I 
am warmed ? Or, to take a stronger instance, if pam is pro- 
duced in me, that is an impression made on me as a sentient 
being— would it do to say in such a case “ I pain,” when the 
truth is I am pained ? So, if knowledge is only an impression 
made on me as an “ intelligence,” or as an intelligent being, 
can it be right for me to say “ I know,” when the truth is 1 
am impressed ? If I am only impressed, I am passive ; and it 
must be absurd as we shall yet more fully see, to say 1 am 
active, as I doubtless do say, when I use the words I 
know.” " „ x* - 
This is a very important point of truth, and worthy^ol oui 
best attention, when careful to see the relations both of Meta- 
physical and of Physical Science. We must, therefore, make as 
sure of it as we can. An intelligence, as already indicated, is 
a person. There is no such thing in being, by itself, as an 
intelligence which is not a person. Intelligence by itself nas 
no existence. It is only the capability of knowledge, belonging 
to a being who is thus capable. An impression on such an 
intelligence, therefore, is an impression on such a being or 
person. We are acquainted with at least three kinds cn 
impressions that are made on such a person, in regard to which 
we should think all are agreed. According to Locxe s systern 
of philosophy, which Mr. Mill follows closely, only two ot 
these kinds of impressions are possible as corning directly 
from the external world, and neither of them is knowledge, 
nor are both combined that which is properly called by mat 
name. There is one kind of impressions that are made upon 
the body without their affecting the senses. The patient, for 
