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example, undergoing an operation under the influence of chlo- 
roform, is impressed, and writhes, groans, and even screams, 
as if sensible of agony, and yet is all the while totally uncon- 
scious. This impression made on the person is (certainly 
enough) not knowledge. There is another kind of impres- 
sions, which are made when the senses only are affected, but 
neither is this properly knowledge. Pain, however acute, and 
pleasure as mere sensation, however pleasant, is not know- 
ledge. Knowledge is thought, but pain and pleasure, merely 
sensational, are not thought. Such a state as mere sensational 
consciousness is no doubt an impression upon an intelligence 
when the sentient being is intelligent, but it is not an impres- 
sion on the intellect as such, but on the mere sense, and hence 
it never is properly called knowledge. This truth is fatal to 
Mr. Stuart Milks idea as we have quoted it. If there is no 
“ sense " for “ the verb to know " but that of an impression 
made by a material object on an intelligence, then, if we adhere 
to what we shall yet see to be Mr. Milks own notions, there 
is no sense, in truth, for the verb at all ! 
Mr. Mill is, as we have said, a follower of Locke in the 
fundamental ideas of what may be called his system of 
thought ; though the additional light which has fallen on philo- 
sophy since Locke's time will mix itself with the darkness 
that broods over those who are yet in bondage to his views. 
Locke's great principle was that (C all ideas come from sensa- 
tion and reflection ." He says — “ Our observation, employed 
either about external sensible objects , or about the internal 
operations of our minds , perceived and reflected on by ourselves , 
is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials 
of. thinking There is much more indicated here than 
“ impressing the intelligence in some specific way." Reflec- 
tion, or the throwing back of the mind on impressions that 
have been made upon it, is found in activity, not in passivity 
like impressions. Yet there is a very serious gap in Locke's 
system. He says, “ Material things as the objects of sensa- 
tion, and the operations of our own minds as the objects of 
reflection, are to me the only originals from whence all our 
ideas take their beginnings." These words make Locke's 
great mistake very evident. If we carefully observe the 
facts of the case we shall find that to speak of an <c object " of 
“ sensation " is to speak inconsistently with truth. Sensation, 
strictly speaking, has no “ object ." It has a cause in the external 
object by means of which it is produced, but that is not an 
object to the sensation nor to the man as merely sentient — it 
* Essay on the Human Understanding , Vol. I., pp. 67, 68. Ed. 1753. 
