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is an object to tbe man only as intelligent. If, for example, 
I am dazzled with light, I have a powerfully produced sensa- 
tion caused by means of the radiance of some luminous sub- 
stance ; but that substance is not in such a case an object to 
me at the moment. All other capabilities of mind are absorbed 
in the one state of sensation. I cannot see from the excess 
of light, — that is, I have no power of attention even, from 
the overpowering degree of the sensation. In the same 
manner excessive pain destroys all intelligence in the agonized 
individual during its continuance. Sensation absorbs him so 
that he can think of nothing ; at certain moments, not even 
of the pain. 
It is, consequently, a fundamental error to speak of the 
“ object” of a sensation. It gives rise to Locke's great error 
in which he confounds sensation and perception. He regarded 
reflection as confined in its objects to the states of a man's own 
mind, and by reflection he means all else in the soul's knowing 
states besides sensation. He overlooked the fact that sensation 
in itself fails to connect the intelligence with external objects, 
and so he reaches the notion that all our knowledge of the ex- 
ternal world is “mediate” — that it is, in fact, the knowledge of 
our own states of mind merely. He calls these states of mind 
with which reflection has to deal “ideas” By real ideas he 
means “ such as have a foundation in Nature ; such as have a 
conformity with the real being and existence of things, or 
with their archetypes."* Locke had a wholesome hatred of 
“ innate ideas," and he may be said to have abolished them ; 
but he remained the dupe of the notion which regards such 
ideas as we acquire, in the light of things or beings, that may 
become objects of contemplation by themselves. Our know- 
ledge of the external world is, according to this system, only 
our knowledge of these ideas. Locke found himself landed 
in real difficulty by means of this notion when he came to 
the point of “reality " in our knowledge. He owns the diffi- 
culty. He proposes the question — “How shall the mind, 
when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they 
agree with things themselves? " *j* That is, how shall we com - 
pare two things luhen we have no hnowledge beyond that of one? 
He most truly says— “ This thought seems not to. want diffi- 
culty." He endeavours to remove the difficulty in a way in 
which he must have felt the weakness of his own reasoning. 
It is not necessary that we should follow him in his. effort. 
It is not true, in fact, that our thought of external objects is 
mediate. The states of our own minds are not the only, nor 
* Essay, Vol. I., page 6. 
f Essay, Vol. II., page 186. 
