228 
that man himself, resulting from his meeting with material 
objects and dealing mentally with them. We may as well say 
that he sees only his seeing, as that he knows nothing beyon 
the states of his own mind. 
Berkeley, as we have seen from his own words, was an un- 
hesitating asserter of the non-existence of material substance 
as such. Some modern authors, who follow m h,s track, aie 
more cautious— we should say timid— m their declarations of 
his doctrine. Following the principle of know-nothmgism, 
which is so acceptable to many, they only say that we do not 
know such a reality as matter. John Stuart Mill states, as the 
popular doctrine, that “all we know of objects is the sensa- 
tions which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of 
these sensations.”* In another sentence he says that, It may, 
therefore, safely be laid down as a truth, both obvious m itself 
and admitted by all whom it is at present necessary to take 
into consideration, that of the outward world we 
can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations ^lch 
experience from it.” f It will be observed that there is > a mani- 
fest inconsistency between these two sentences— the first 
admits the “ order” of our sensations as well as the sensations 
themselves , the second excludes « absolutely ” that “order ” It 
will be seen also that they are both utterly irreconcilable with 
that description of knowledge which we have before quoted from 
Mr Mill, when he says that it consists of the revelations of con- 
sciousness, and all leoitimate inferences derived from these reve- 
lations. We have, surely enough, consciousness of more than 
sensations, and legitimate inferences of more than their order of 
occurrence in the mind. But there is also marked inconsistency 
between this language as to knowledge, and the first which 
we quoted from Mr. Mill— that the only sense in which the vero 
< 4 kno w ” has any meaning is found in the properties of objects 
impressing the intelligence- Sensations, as we have seen, are 
not impressions on the intelligence, not even on an mtelligem 
beine as such. They are impressions on the senses only— that is, 
hnSons on a being who might have these impressions 
if he had no intelligence or capability of thought whatever 
in his nature. Where thereis such confusion of ldeasandreckless- 
ness of expression it is not cause for wonder that a writer should 
reach any sort of conclusion either m regard to matter ; Oi , 
mind A “sensation” is certainly not an _ inference 
and the “order” in which sensations occur in the mind is 
not itself a sensation. Neither is any impression on the mtel- 
* System of Logic, Vol. I., p. 64, edition 1865. 
f lb., page 66. 
