229 
ligence as such capable of being confounded with an impression 
on the senses. And yet all would need to be one and the 
same — sensations — ideas of order — impressions on the intel- 
ligence traceable to no object capable of affecting the senses 
all must be identical — in order to the consistency of Mr. 
Mill's statements as to our knowledge of substances. 
If we rid ourselves of the confusion thus doubly and trebly 
confounded in the tangled thinking of so-called philosophy, we 
meet a question which accords with at least one of Mr. Mill's 
ideas of knowledge. — Is our inference, that substance exists 
and that qualities are only modes of the being of this substance 
a legitimate inference ? If it is so, then we know that sub- 
stance does exist, and that sensible qualities are only modes of 
its existence. 
But here it is necessary to be careful that we really under- 
stand what we mean by a mode of existence. We get at this 
by passing from the mere abstract idea of a niode } or manner 
to the concrete idea of the mode or manner of being in a 
particular object. Let us take the case of an elastic ball and 
its form. It is round, in the form of a sphere. Press it between 
the finger and thumb, and it is no longer of the same form. 
It exists at first in the mode of a sphere — then in that of 
another figure— and when we let it resume its first mode it 
exists m that again. These mere changeful modes of being 
are nothing apart from that whose mere modes or manners 
they are. The inference, as to whose legitimacy we are inquir- 
mg, is, that the form of the ball is not itself the ball. Here 
again we come upon another nhase of the question 
May I legitimately infer that the affection of sense in me is a 
mode of my being caused by an external object ? If I take up 
?. P iec f, of S old and bring it before my eye I have the sense of 
its yellow colour. If I remove the gold from the range of 
vision 1 have the sense of yellow no longer. If I repeat this 
double experiment millions of times I have each time the same 
lesult. Is it a legitimate inference that this piece of gold is 
capable of giving me this sensation of a yellow colour ? If 
such a thing as a legitimate inference can be the result of the 
most perfect induction this is such an inference. What I call 
yetlow in a bit of gold, is only a certain form or arrangement 
virtlle of which ;t transmits the 
of ithb 1 ^iW ? a P articnlar way— it is only a mode 
of being m the gold, and the sensation of yellow is only a mode 
of being m me The mode in the gold is answered by the 
I ii?frwkt’v d ^ th °?? ld invariably gives me the sensation, 
I infer that it is invariably capable of doing so. But a capa- 
