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power,” or call it “ life ” which is at least as good a term the 
mere change of words makes no difference m the thing. It is 
not, like motion, a mere mode of existence in the nerves, it is 
that which gives them motion. We do not contemplate the 
dead brain as motionless merely, but as lacking that whici 
once moved it. Here then is a nervous system every way 
perfect so far as the material is concerned, and another 
perhaps not nearly so perfect, yet the latter is full of sensa- 
tion, emotion, and thought —are we not scientifically shut m 
to believe that there is a substance present m this latter case 
which is absent in the former? It is only trifling m such 
a matter to say “if we knew all the conditions/ or to say 
“ we can conceive of such and such things.'' The case is 
before us and in full comparison, as truly as the real and 
sulphurless gunpowder, and the inference in both cases is 
equally clear. It is of no use to say we “imagine a spirit 
beyond the ganglions ;-we imagine nothing,— we infer a spirit, 
as we infer the sulphur in the gunpowder that explodes. Iso 
one will say we “imagine" this sulphur,— why then should 
he say we “imagine" “mind”? I am informed by one ot 
the first men in Britain as an experienced authority m mental 
maladies, that the brain of a man dying in perfect sanity has 
been compared with that of one dying m madness, and that 
by no means of which science is possessed, could there be 
detected the slightest difference between the nervous masses. 
Is there any inference in science more legitimate than that 
which would deduce from facts like this, the existence of a 
substance capable of derangement and distinct from the 
nervous matter in man? How is it that we conclude that 
certain substances are in certain combinations . of substance ; 
In no other way than by certain effects which show their 
presence How do we conclude that a mental substance is 
present in that combination of substances to which we give 
the name of a living man? Just by modes of being indicated 
by their effects, and which belong to no material substance 
whatever. How does Hr. Havey know that there, are gan- 
glions in the human body but by effects which indicate their 
peculiar modes of existence? How do I know that there is 
such a thing as a mind in a man with whom I am acquainted r 
Exactly in the same way by the peculiar effects which that 
mind from its qualities produces not only upon my senses but 
also upon my thinking and emotional self. We thus reach the 
reality of mind as a substance just as we reach the reality ot 
matter. We are forced, if we would not be stupidly ignorant, 
to know that there are two great classes of substances m the 
universe — two classes because essentially distinct in their 
