248 
is as truly that the person originates change, while the thing 
never does so. Now there is no induction, as already lemaiked, 
more perfect than that which leads us to mind as the origina- 
tor of motion or change. Take Mr. Grove's beautiful experi- 
ment, already described, showing the correlation of forces — 
begin at the last and proceed to the first in the series of changes, 
and you reach the person who ({ at will raises the shuttei, Ox 
allows it to remain closed. You may imagine that the volition 
of this person is the result of a change in the brain, preceding 
it, but you do not need to imagine any other link in the chaim 
The movement of the needle is a visible fact the heating 01 
the helix is a fact— the magnetism of the coil is a fact— the 
electric motion of the wire is a fact— the chemical change is a 
fact— the admission of light is a fact— the raising of the shutter 
is a fact — the motion of the finger is a fact — so is the act of will a 
fact. But where is the evidence of a material change going 
before this act of will in the person who raises the shutter ? 
We have nothing to do with Mr. Milks {e apprehension, or 
with the apprehension of anybody else. We have to do with 
facts that are palpable to all who choose to look at them. It is 
only trifling to talk of what one can conceive and another cannot 
conceive, in a case where the plainest and most unquestionable 
matters of fact compel all alike to come to one conclusion, or 
to escape into the region of mere “ apprehension ” for argument 
by which to oppose these facts. If matter were capable ol 
originating its own changes it would surely be possible to find 
at least one instance in which it has been found to do so. 
But, so far as man can by experiment question this substance, 
no change, or series of changes has ever been discovered m 
which a mind, or in other words a person, was not at the origin 
as the first mover. To refer to the changes that go on m nature 
would be simply to beg the question, should any one say that 
these are originated by no one. For, when in every case m 
which it is possible for man to test the nature of material ob- 
jects, they are found inert till moved into change by a person ; 
on what ground can it be proved that they cease to be inert 
when beyond the reach of man ? 
Mr. Mill speaks of its being more congruous to our natural 
conceptions to believe that matter acts on mind, than to be- 
lieve that mind acts on matter. It is of very small moment 
in a scientific question, what may happen to seem congruous 
to a man's conceptions. We must look at the facts, and not 
at our conceptions apart from them. In every case rn which 
we have true access to a chain of facts in the material world, 
there is a first link beyond which we cannot come. It is that 
first fact to which special attention needs to be called in every 
