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It may be well liere to consider more fully tlie reality and 
true nature of volition. Is there such a thing as true will? 
In other words, is a man conscious of the capability of truly 
originating a line of motion by being the first to move in that 
line ? As an illustration of our question, suppose a chain of 
changes, such as Grove places before us in his beautiful experi- 
ment already described, and in which he says “ light is the 
initiatory force,” but in which he shows that “ the will of the 
experimenter ” who raises the shutter is really that force. Is 
this will a myth, or is it a real property of the conscious 
mind ? It is admitted that, as regards external objects, we 
know our sensations. We, then, do at least know our sensa- 
tions. But do we know these sensations in any manner in 
which we do not know our volitions ? Is not our knowledge 
in both cases equally immediate and necessary ? If I have the 
sensation of cold, and you insist that I do not infer that I am 
cold, but that the sensation is matter of direct consciousness, 
then, if I will to raise my arm, do I any more infer that I will 
than* I infer in the former case that I am cold? I am dis- 
posed to think that I infer in both cases ; but assuredly I am 
conscious of the one thing as directly as I am conscious of the 
other. Sensational consciousness is not more real than voli- 
tional consciousness ; hence, if we may say that we know our 
sensations as feelings, we may just as truly say we know our 
acts of will as volitions. 
But what is that property of mind with which we are thus 
as certainly acquainted as we are with our capability of sensa- 
tion? In our sensations we learn of something without us 
which produces a certain effect within us. In our volitions 
we learn of something within us which is followed by effects 
that lie without us. The “ I feel” expresses the former; the 
“ ; 1 will ” expresses the latter. Take the case of the scientific 
experimenter as our illustration again. His instrument, we 
shall say, is all arranged and ready for action. He sees it — 
that is sensation; but the instrument is motionless. He feels 
it merely — that is sensation; but it is yet motionless. So 
long as he has only sensations from it, the experiment refrains 
from beginning. All is ready, including his own material 
organization, which is as necessary to the changes to be 
effected as any part of the machine, but there is no experi- 
ment until he moves in an act of will; then the shutter is 
raised, and all the motious follow. You may just as philo- 
sophically say that he knows nothing at all, as say that he does 
not know of this causative act of his own mind. Then this act 
is essentially different from all mere effects produced in the 
mind, such as sensations. It is not part of our consciousness 
