in the case of any sensation that it might be otherwise than it 
is, and that in the same circumstances. If touched with a 
red-hot iron, no one conceives that he may or may not have a 
sensation of heat ; or, when he has that sensation, thinks that 
it might be just the opposite if he pleased. But every one 
knows, in a true instance of volition, that lie may or may not 
will, and that he may will otherwise than he does. Even, 
then, if we admit that we know only of antecedents and con- 
sequents, it remains irresistibly evident that the first mover in 
every series of changes that lies fully within the reach of 
human observation is the mind in its act of will. But this 
moving of mind, which is the first antecedent, is essentially 
unlike all mere consequents. It differs from all sensation, not 
only as one sensation differs from another, but in the very 
characteristic by which a cause, properly speaking, differs from 
an effect. 
Here, however, we are met by something like the assertion 
already alluded to, that this movement of mind which we call 
willing, or volition, is itself only a consequence of material 
movements. Those who imagine that the only cause of which 
we can properly speak in discoursing of natural objects is an 
“ assemblage of conditions,” are strongly tempted to look at 
the mere “ assemblage of conditions ” which precedes an act 
of will as the cause of that act. It is well to keep in mind 
that, even were this true, it would not in the least degree alter 
the fact that, in all those chains of material change which we 
can fairly test by experiment, mind is the first mover. We 
are, however, led by this notion — that volition is itself only an 
effect — into a totally different field of thought from that in 
which we observe the facts of the material universe. Our 
inquiry here is as to the nature of mind, not as moving first in 
a chain of otherwise material movements, but as moving last 
in such a chain. We all know that we have abundance of 
experiments in which the various modes of material movement 
follow the one spiritual movement of will. Here we must call 
for experiments in which this movement of will forms the 
closing link, so to speak, in a chain of material motions. A 
superficial thinker will probably conclude that these are very 
numerous. He will naturally turn to those cases in which 
painful material changes issue in volition. He might add to 
these, however, all cases in which pleasurable changes affect 
the volitional being. This is not his proper field of testing* 
fact. He must be brought to deal with those other cases in 
which what may be called the inertia of mind is most signal l} 7- 
manifest. The “ will nots ” must be carefully studied as well 
as the “ wills.” In the study of these, we think, he will 
