mind is, in every case coming under our observation, the first 
to move, and that matter never is in any such case the first— 
this of itself is sufficient to sugg'est that there is something in 
this first mover, which is not in any of those that are moved, 
and in their turn move the others. Even if we could not in 
any way tell what this difference is, so as to give it an intelli- 
gible name, it would be wilful blindness in us to deny that there 
is a difference. If, as is manifest, no assemblage of conditions 
in which this moving mind is absent is ever followed by any 
change, so far as we can interrogate nature on the subject, ve 
are shut up to regard this mind as having something in the 
nature of a capability of moving as distinguished from that of 
merely being moved. By fair induction we thus reach the 
general truth, that a man is the first cause of bis own actions, 
and so the real and responsible author of all the consequents 
that flow from them. 
The subject of “ motives 33 comes naturally before us here. 
Materialists take great advantage of the false notions of their 
opponents on this point. A “ motive 93 is that which moves. 
If something which necessarily moves the man in his act of will 
really exists in every case of volition, then the man is not the 
first to move. But does any such thing as this necessary 
mover of the man really exist ? If it does so, it must be 
demonstrable. What sort of thing may it be? It must be 
either a substance, or a state of a substance. No one will 
contend that a (C motive 33 is the former, so it must be the latter. 
A motive then is a state of a substance, and that substance 
must be either body or mind. As we have seen, states of the 
body are followed by acts of will; so are states of the mind. 
If our induction could be so lame as to be satisfied with this mere 
antecedence and consequence, then we might set down these 
states of body and mind as the movers , or as the true causes 
of volition. But by such an induction we might regard night 
as the true cause of day, inasmuch as night is an antecedent, 
and day its consequent. Our induction must be full. It .must 
take in at least all classes of facts that bear on the point in 
hand. When we do take in all classes of such facts, we find 
that so-called {C motives 33 as often fail to be followed by voli- 
tion, as prove to be followed by it. If a motive is that 
which moves, what then is that which does not move? Or, if 
a motive is that which is followed by motion, what is that 
which is not followed by motion ? It is not a motive. It can- 
not, to say the least, be that which necessarily moves. But the 
same states of body and mind that are in one case followed by 
volition, are in other cases followed by no volition. The same 
