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real a cause as He who produced him. Then again, if the First 
Cause had not produced causes, he would not have produced 
“ all things.” Mr. ManseTs definition is self-destructive. To 
speak of a First Cause as that which produces “ all things/ 3 is 
either to speak most loosely, or to ignore the reality of created 
causes. Then Mr. Mansel says — “ By the Absolute is meant 
that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relations 
to any other being.” So he says again, ff a cause cannot, as such, 
be absolute,” and when we ask why ? he says — the cause, as 
such, exists only in relation to its effect ! ” Is it the case that a 
cause, as such, cannot exist without its effect? Did not the Great 
First Cause exist before the creation he called into being ? Is 
not that Being who, as a cause, uncaused himself, produces all 
other being, absolutely perfect as a cause ; and is not his per- 
fection, as such, demonstrated by such effects ? Mr. Mansel 
and those who agree with him confound their own thinking, by 
introducing elements into their conceptions apparently for 
the sole purpose of making them inconceivable. What possible 
connection has the producing of all things with the concep- 
tions of a First Cause ? Does not a First presuppose a 
second? And what possible connection has the absence of 
all necessary relations, such as cause and effect, with the 
conceptions of the true Absolute ? Is not the Absolute itself 
related to the non-absolute ? The perfect surely stands in 
relation to the imperfect. Must we conceive of it as no longer 
perfect because it does so ? Then as to the infinite, Mr. 
Mansel says — By The Infinite is meant that which is free 
from all possible limitation — that than which a greater is 
inconceivable, and which consequently can receive no addi- 
tional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all 
eternity.” Observe this u consequently.” It is introduced 
as part of the definition of the Infinite. But the question is 
forced upon us — What connection has this consequence with 
the Infinite, so far as the additional “ mode of existence” is 
concerned ? Every thought of the Infinite mind is a mode of 
existence ; but is it essential to infinity that no fresh thought 
should rise in that mind ? Is divine unchangeableness a 
stereotyped eternal sameness in every mode of being ? When 
philosophy runs itself up to this, has not philosophy run 
mad ? “ How can the Infinite become that which it was not 
at first ?” Such is Mr. ManseTs question. And we ask what 
can hinder it ? If this Infinite” is not a mere absurd fig- 
ment of the brain — if it is a living and thinking Being — if, 
as we know, it is God, Who only is the Infinite, why should 
not He become the Creator of the soul He forms to-day, and 
yet be still the Infinite, just because His power is equal 
