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which has no hounds. These are attributes distinct enough , 
and the very attributes that mould our thoughts of each. 
But it is, as we have seem, in Mr. Mansehs extravagant 
notions of what is meant philosophically by the “ Infinite ” in 
which we find the root of his confusion. He says — “ The 
Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as 
potentially everything and actually nothing ! ” He is clearly 
thinking of the Infinite in the abstract. But that is neither 
potentially nor actually anything. If what he says is true .of 
infinity as a mode of existence, it must be true of the Being 
whose mode of existence it is. So Glod must be potentially 
everything and actually nothing ! But what are the reasons 
given for this monstrous writing ? “For,” says Mr. Mansel, 
“ if there is anything in general which it cannot become it is 
thereby limited ; and if there is anything in particular which it 
actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing.” 
Again, we must remark that if he is writing of the abstract 
idea of infinity, it can become nothing in general, and it is 
nothing either in general or in particular. It can only be the 
manner of being to one who is infinite, and so in itself is 
nothing and can be nothing. If he is writing of the Infinite 
One, his language is unaccountable. Put in the concrete and 
applied to the only Infinite Being it says, that “if there is 
anything in general which He cannot become. He is thereby 
limited, and if there is anything in particular which he actually 
is, he is thereby excluded from being any other thing.” He 
cannot become finite; is he thereby limited? To be finite is 
something in general which he cannot become, but in what 
amazing way can this set limits to His being ? He is in this 
particular aspect or mode of His existence actually infinite, 
and cannot be anything else ; but in what way does this limit 
Him ? Is it possible to put greater absurdity in language 
than that we have quoted ? But out of what does this absurdity 
spring ? Out of the idea that to think of any object is to set 
limits to that object ! So, to think of the Infinite is to set 
limits to Him, though in the very thought we put these limits 
away, and think of their absence as the grand distinction in the 
object thought of! Mr. Mansel says again, that “Whatever 
we conceive is, by the very act of conception, regarded as 
finite .” So when we conceive of an object which has no 
limits we conceive of it as having limits ! 
When we ask ourselves what aim a writer can have in 
putting down such extraordinary sentences, it seems that 
Mr. Mansel imagines he is favouring true religion. But 
what is all this unaccountable logic intended to work out 
in favour of a truly religious state of mind? That alb 
