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after part of it I entered into the arguments without difficulty, and, con- 
sidering the great value, in the days we live, of having such subjects 
thoroughly gone into, I am sure that all here, without any critical examination 
of the differences of opinion that may well exist upon some points, will join 
heartily in saying that the learned author of the paper is entitled to our 
utmost respect and gratitude. (Hear, hear.) 
Mr. Warington. — My Lord, we have little time left, and I will therefore 
begin what I have to say at once, so as to leave as much time for others as 
possible. It is unpleasant, after the beautiful finish of Professor Kirk’s paper, 
with which all of us must so heartily agree, to turn back to the drier matter 
of its commencement in the way of criticism ; and yet I am sure Professor 
Kirk would wish his paper to be criticised, and therefore I do not hesitate 
to set about the task. Professor Kirk begins with a long metaphysical 
introduction ; it seemed to me somewhat unnecessary, as being a kind of 
introduction equally appropriate to every subject whatever which we have to 
discuss. We must know what “ knowing” is before discussing any part 'of 
knowledge, and I do not see how it is more needed here than in subjects 
generally. Passing now to details, I cannot but think there were one or two 
cases in which our author was rather hair-splitting in his criticism of other 
writers, and especially of Mr. John Stuart Mill. I am no advocate for Mr. 
J. S. Mill, and should dissent from his philosophy as much as Professor Kirk 
does ; but I think Professor Kirk has dealt with him somewhat unfairly, and 
strained several of his expressions in a manner very undeserved. But of this 
more presently. I notice, also, one or two scientific errors in the Paper. For 
instance, Professor Kirk speaks of light as a movement in the atmosphere. 
Now, light passes with equal ease through a vacuum, and is therefore plainly 
not a movement in the atmosphere. It passes also with ease through trans- 
parent solids or liquids in which there is no air. Yet so completely is this 
erroneous idea ingrained in the Professor’s mind, that he speaks of “ ether ” 
as being now regarded by philosophers as a nonentity. I should like to know 
the modem philosopher who thinks so 
Eev. W. Mitchell. — Does not Professor Grove do so ? I rather think 
in his last work he does. 
Mr. Warington. — It may be so ; but I was not aware of it. Then as to 
the criticism which Professor Kirk gives as to what we mean by a I know.” 
He seems to take it for granted that it must be an action of the mind on 
something. I confess I do not see why the expression may not have the 
same sense as “I see, I feel, I hear, I smell,” in every one of which cases 
there is reference to an impression made on ourselves by something without. 
It is surely false logic to say that because we have certain words, as “ pain, 
warm,” &c., which are construed in a more active sense, therefore we may not 
take “ I know ” as to be construed in the same manner as “ I see, I feel,” &c. 
I do not see any reason why it should not come under this category rather 
than the other. Professor Kirk chooses to define the verb “ to know ” in a 
different sense from that adopted by J. S. Mill and others, which difference 
in definition constitutes the whole of his criticism, without any reason to 
