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the word “ cause.” He might perhaps, in accordance with that use of the 
word, speak of the combustion in the match as the cause of the combustion 
in the gas, and that again loosely as the “ cause ” of the flame in the burner. 
But if he means to use language with philosophical accuracy, and to think 
clearly on the subject, he must use the word “ cause ” in the sense of the 
first to move in the series of motions in question. If he does this, and goes 
back till he finds out the first mover in the lighting of the gas, he will get 
beyond the “ combustion ” even of his own brain, so as to fix on that 
“ combustion ” which I call his will, whatever that may mean. He will find, 
in truth, that he himself is the responsible originator of his actions and their 
proper consequences, and not merely a director, as he imagines. 
On the two points of “ motives ” in the world of mind, and “ conditions ” 
in that of matter, Mr. Warington seems to have but one leading idea — it is 
that “ conditions determine the course of events.” If I understand him 
aright, he means, with Mr. John Stuart Mill, that an “ assemblage of 
conditions ” is that which alone is properly regarded as a “ cause,” whether 
in relation to moral or physical occurrences. Mr. Warington’ s words are : “ It 
is to be remembered, that a man’s action is the result, not of one motive 
acting alone, but of a whole series of motives variously counterbalancing 
each other.” This exactly expresses Mr. Mill’s idea on the subject. The 
strictly logical effect of this notion is the belief that the universe is a machine 
whose purely mechanical movements embrace all those of mind as well as all 
those of matter. Professor Tyndall gives expression to the state of soul which 
craves this idea. In his article on Miracles in the Fortnightly Review for 
June, 1867, speaking of the relation between “forces” and “ phenomena ” 
as “necessary,” he says, — “ Not until this relation is established is the law 
of reason rendered concentric with the laws of nature, and not until this is 
effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in peace.” That is, 
when put into plain words, — the mind that can rest in anything but the 
absolute and universally mechanical is not that of a “ scientific philosopher ” ! 
If conditions necessarily determine results, so that all natural sequences are 
matters of pure necessity, then there is not only no man — there is no God 
that determines anything. The “ conditions ” arise as the necessary result of 
“ conditions ” that were necessary before them, and so on back to all 
eternity ! So, too, must it be forward to all eternity ! And is there no one 
who may be called a “ scientific philosopher” who can rest in peace in any 
other view of the universe than this 1 Mr. Warington is very far indeed, 
I am sure, from entertaining such a view. He does not think out his ideas 
as Professor Tyndall has thought out his ; but so far as he holds that 
“ conditions determine results,” and forgets the personal will , which alone 
is true cause, he is on the same track with the believers in a mechanical 
universe, and from whose belief the idea of the living God is effectually 
excluded. 
But this mechanical theory is utterly inconsistent with that observed 
variation which Mr. Warington has not fully considered, and which is as 
assuredly a matter of scientific certainty as anything can possibly be. Mr, 
