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to be inconsistent with true philosophy, when we imagine a cause that is not 
required to explain all the phenomena in any particular case or class of cases 
in Nature. But if we imagine a force, in such a case as this of lighting the 
match, which is neither matter nor mind, we do imagine an unnecessary cause. 
Motion originated in volition by mind, passes on its course, changing from one 
mode into another till light appears. There is mind and matter— force of 
mind and motion of matter — but nothing more. If we rise from the lighting 
of a match to the kindling of the great sun itself, what reason can we have 
for interpolating a “ force ” in that case which is totally wanting in the other ? 
If it is argued that though God kindles the sun, there must be a force or 
cause then, in the sun itself, such as makes the agitation in that orb go out 
into space, I reply that this agitation passes to all surrounding objects, as 
ordinary motion passes from one portion say of water to another, and it 
passes through all objects that are susceptible of such agitations ; but this is 
essentially unlike that which is, I think, properly called “force,” as that 
exists in mind, originating motion, and accounting for its existence. We have 
mind and matter — the force of mind and the motion of matter— there ; and 
true philosophy not only asks no more, but refuses to admit any more. 
I am glad to see that all who have spoken on the subject see the 
importance of the metaphysics, or, as I should call it, the philosophy of 
this great question, and perceive that it is in this region that the difficulties 
of inquiring minds chiefly lie. It is consequently this same region which 
we must enter, to deal with those difficulties. In this work I have offered 
my humble share of effort in the essay in hand. 
But I seem to have said enough, and will only add my very warmest 
acknowledgments of the kind manner in which I have been dealt with by 
all concerned. 
Y 'J. 
