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attributes of an animal, to the view which I have before 
expressed as to his physiological attributes; viz., that they 
are proportioned to the necessities of his existence ; and we 
cannot, in attempting to determine the psychical differentia 
of man and brute, base our reasoning on the analogy of 
physical structure with any regard to the results of obser- 
vation. 
The usual classification of the mental faculties is that which 
divides them into Feeling and Intellect. All feelings are 
instinctive; and the only objection to substituting the word 
“ instinct” in this classification is that instinct may be defined 
as a tendency to act in a particular manner without reference 
to the reasoning powers (supposing them to exist), whereas 
“ feeling 99 is the psychological condition which results in this 
tendency. Instinct is the only non-intellectual source of 
action; that is, all actions which do not proceed from the 
intellect are instinctive actions, whether the immediate cause 
of such actions is or is not within the scope of the perceptions. 
It is usually understood in a more limited sense, as implying, 
according to Paley, “ a propensity prior to experience and 
independent of instruction.” The defect of this definition is 
that, by excluding the element of memory, it necessitates a 
division of the sources of animal action into blind instinct and 
intelligence ; whereas it is often a matter of great difficulty to 
decide whether any particular action performed by an animal 
may be reasonably ascribed to a perception of the conse- 
quences of that action. We see a duckling, which has been 
hatched under a hen, making for the water directly after it 
has emerged from the egg ; and we see a bird startled by the 
sight of a gun. In the case of the duckling we have an indu- 
bitable instance of the operation of blind instinct ; but on the 
other hand, the bird who takes to flight at the sight of the 
gun does so because it has learnt by experience to associate 
the appearance of the gun with the impression of danger. In 
both cases the animal obeys the dictates of its instinct, and 
we are not warranted in looking on these actions as springing 
from two different sources. Memory is a distinct quality in 
itself, and is peculiar neither to intellect nor instinct. It is 
indispensable, as we well know, to the exercise of the reflec- 
tive powers, and although, in regard to instinct, we can 
dispense with it on Sir Isaac Newton's hypothesis of the 
continual intervention of the Deity, we may ask why, in this 
case, is not the bird frightened by the gun before the destruc- 
tive properties of that weapon have been practically impressed 
upon it ? The fact is that memory enters very extensively 
into the operations of instinct, and is extremely useful in 
