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marcation. We can afford to discuss the question on a posteriori 
grounds ; and considering that there exists between man and 
brute a psychological difference totally disproportionate to the 
physiological difference, considering that this difference is 
incomparably greater than that which can be shown to exist 
between any two samples which may be selected from the 
brute creation, notwithstanding great variety of structure — • 
considering that the vast majority of the actions performed by 
an animal are unquestionably due to the operation of his 
instinct — considering that in language man possesses an 
instrument for exchanging ideas with the most degraded 
members of his species, without that appeal to the instinct 
which constitutes the only means by which he is able to 
influence the actions of lower animals — I think it is tolerably 
evident that Mr. Pike has coolly placed the onus probandi on 
the wrong side. 
The arguments which he has put forward in favour of the 
intellectual similarity of man and brute, are not so irrefutable 
as he seems to imagine. They consist, to a great extent, of 
specimens of a style of reasoning which is rather extensively 
employed by the upholders of the views which he advocates, 
and which is by no means calculated to dissipate the obscurity 
in which the subject is involved. 
The opinion of a given metaphysician as to the point at issue 
having been selected, and this opinion having been assumed 
to constitute a definition intended to express the sum of the 
intellectual differences between man and brute, it is then 
demonstrated by extending or perverting the meaning of the 
terms employed (a process which is rendered comparatively 
easy by the unavoidable ambiguity of metaphysical language), 
that the definition embraces psychical phenomena which are 
indisputably manifested by certain of the lower animals. Thus 
we find Mr. Pike disposing of Lockers opinion that brutes do 
not possess general ideas , an opinion endorsed by Professor 
Max Mliller. Quoting a remark of Professor Muller's, to the 
effect that, “ when a whale is struck, the whole shoal, though 
widely dispersed, are instantly made aware of the presence of 
an enemy,” Mr. Pike asks, “ What is communicated in this 
case but a general idea — the idea of danger ? 99 Here we have 
a characteristic example of the method of ratiocination which I 
have just described. In making the word “ idea 93 include 
the simple operation of an object upon the instinct, Mr. Pike 
invests it with a meaning which, as far as I am aware, has 
never been attached to it either by Locke or any one else. I 
have already pointed out the fact that there is an essential 
difference between Intellect and Instinct, as well as the entire 
