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absence of any proof that an intellectual operation intervenes — 
in the animal psychology — between the perception of an object 
and the action resulting from such perception. We may, 
indeed, regard the whale as revolving within himself the 
expediency of adopting this or that course of action, and 
ultimately arriving, by an inconceivably rapid process of 
reasoning, at the conclusion that it is advisable to make off; 
but, inasmuch as he always does make off under the circum- 
stances, it is obvious that any such process of reasoning is 
entirely unnecessary, even if we can call that a process of 
reasoning which invariably leads to the same conclusion. Nor 
does the communication of the “ idea ” to the other whales 
argue the possession of a higher order of intelligence. We 
know that many animals manifest certain feelings by in- 
voluntary motions of the body. A dog expresses pleasure by 
wagging his tail, a cat by the elevation of the same member. 
We may suppose in like manner that the whale shows his 
alarm by some movement which is a direct and invariable 
product of that feeling, and which is readily comprehended by 
the other whales, as it would be common to all of them if 
similarly situated. 
With the word “ general 39 Mr. Pike has taken a liberty 
which almost amounts to a pun. As applied to “ idea 99 it 
means either the distribution of the same idea entertained by 
one individual amongst several objects, or the distribution of a 
particular idea of the same object amongst several individuals. 
Conventional usage sanctions both meanings, but while Locke 
used the word in the former sense, Mr. Pike interprets it in 
the latter, in which sense it does not in the smallest degree 
affect the value of the term “ idea 99 as a psychical phenomenon. 
That animals have general impressions , or, in other words, 
that the same feelings of fear, anger, &c. are produced by 
different objects, is beyond all doubt; and our notions of 
creative wisdom would be seriously modified if we found a 
hare running away from a dog, and standing still when 
attacked by a wolf, or flying from both animals and not get- 
ting out of the way of a falling tree. But in the case mentioned 
by Mr. Pike the impression — for it is not an idea — is only 
general in so far as it is shared by the whales generally. 
In another place, speaking of the fact that a parrot has 
been seen to drop a hollow nut without attempting to crack 
it, Mr. Pike asserts that the parrot <( could only have arrived 
at the conclusion that the nut was hollow by what philosophers 
would dignify with the grand title of syllogism.” 
Every action, whether of man or brute, may be regarded as 
the result of a syllogistic process. But a syllogism is merely 
