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The Chairman. — I am sure you will all cordially concur in a Vote of thanks 
to Mr. Morshead for his valuable paper. (Hear, hear.) I am sorry he is 
unable to be present ; and now I invite discussion upon the paper. 
Rev. C. A. Row. — I do not rise for the purpose of impugning the general 
statements or results which Mr. Morshead has embodied in his paper, 
but I own I do think that some portions of his argument have not been pro- 
perly sustained. If I understand him rightly, Mr. Morshead considers that 
all the actions of brutes may be accounted for by the use of the terms in- 
stinct, memory, and natural sagacity. N o w, I confess I am unable to under- 
stand what natural sagacity means, unless it be some exertion of what we call 
intellect. Mr. Morshead denies that brutes possess intellect, although he 
admits his inability to define what we mean by intellect. Now, I do not 
mean to say that an animal has the same intellect, or anything like the same 
intellect, as a man possesses, but I do think that brutes possess an intelligence 
which produces, though of course in a much less degree, results something 
like those produced by the intellect of man. If I see in brutes certain results 
produced, which, had they been in us, we should say resulted from man’s 
intellect, I think I have ground for inferring that there is a certain amount 
of intellect, though, of course, of a much lower kind than man’s, at the bottom 
of those results ; and I cannot think what natural sagacity is in brutes, unless 
it is some sort of intellectual power. Mr. Morshead assumes that everything 
done by animals is the result of instinct or memory* or both combined. Now, 
I cannot see what substantial result can be accomplished by memory, unless 
we give it the aid of some kind of intellectual power. Take the instance, 
which Mr. Morshead has quoted, of a bird “ taking to flight at the sight of 
a gun, because it has learnt by experience to associate the appearance of the 
gun with the impression of danger.” Now, I have often held a stick up 
towards a bird, and it has not been in the least alarmed ; but I have no 
doubt that if I had held up a gun instead, it would have made off at once. 
Is that the result of instinct or of memory ? or is it the result of some 
reflective intellectual power ? I cannot understand how instinct alone could 
make a bird apprehend that there is danger in a gun, and none at all in a 
stick. I know that a great many of the anecdotes one reads of animals are 
not altogether reliable, but I will pledge my word for the truth of one or two 
which I am about to mention. I formerly kept bees for some time. Now, 
any one who is at all acquainted with the habits of bees is aware that the bee 
constructs a cell according to the perfect principles of mathematics, and it is 
of course impossible to suppose that that is the result of anything but 
instinct. But, under circumstances of necessity, it is well known that the 
bee is capable of varying the size, form, and build of its cells, and that, I 
think, goes some way to show that the bee possesses some measure of 
intellectual power, though not of the same kind as, and inferior to, man’s 
intellect. In a village where I kept bees at one time, a number of other per- 
sons also kept bees, and a hive full of comb was kept in a house in my 
garden. In swarming time a great number of the neighbouring bees came 
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