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though the number of their ideas is very limited indeed ; and they are 
capable of exercising a comparison of such ideas as they do have. I under- 
stand Mr. Morshead to state that a dog only barks under the influence of 
fear. I doubt that very much ; but at any rate, whether that is true or not, 
I know that a dog barks sometimes, and if it fails in arousing the attention 
of a person near, whose attention it wishes to arouse, it will go to him and 
endeavour to attract his attention in some other way, as though saying, 
“ Why don’t you come and see what is the matter?” Mind, I am not con- 
troverting the general conclusions of Mr. Morshead : I only wish it to be 
understood that I should arrive at those conclusions on grounds considerably 
different from his. One of the great distinctions between man and the 
lower animals is found in the possession by man of the moral faculties. I 
do not mean to say that a dog, however, is entirely void of all moral 
ideas, as Mr. Morshead has asserted. I am not prepared to say that, 
because I remember a dog which I had for many years, and when I was 
going out, if I said, “ Dash, you must not come ” — not at all in an angry 
tone — the dog, which at other times was anxious to follow me, would at once 
stop and remain at home. I do not mean to say that Dash understood the 
language I used, but he had some understanding which, to my mind, was 
something more than mere instinct. I think the dog has unquestionably 
a sense of affection to its master, and that certainly has some remote analogy 
to the moral qualities. A great many of the brutes exercise a kind of 
morality which, if all men only possessed as much, would make us all better 
and happier than we are. The great distinction between man and the lower 
animals is, however, the large absence on the part of brutes of moral ideas, and, 
above all, in the absence of spiritual ideas ; and in those two branches I 
include a large range of ideality. Of course I am prepared to admit at once 
that I do not think brutes can reason syllogistically, but I am thoroughly 
satisfied that human beings never reason syllogistically either. No doubt we 
can reduce our reasoning into the syllogistic form ; but, practically, we never do 
reason in that way. We p^ss with great rapidity over a vast number of links 
in the chain of our reasoning. There is another point in Mr. Morshead’s 
paper which caught my attention. He spoke of “ the chamois who fin ds 
himself, when followed by the hunter, suddenly confronted by a chasm, the 
width of which slightly exceeds his leaping power, and will not attempt to 
get over it if there is any other way open to him and he thinks, because 
the animal makes its choice instantly, that therefore it is impossible it should 
have been influenced by any reasoning power. Now, I apprehend that some 
of the highest processes of reasoning and of intellect are gone through in- 
stantaneously. In my own case, I have often found, when I have been 
engaged in literary composition, that many of the things I have done 
quickest have been the best I have ever done ; and surely such work belongs 
to the highest class of intellectual work. A vast number of our intellectual 
actions are accomplished more rapidly than we can ever analyze. Because I 
cannot analyze the process by which I speak to you now, does it therefore 
follow that that process is not highly intellectual ? I do not think because a 
