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moth ; but in those seasons when it is abundant — and I am following Kirby 
and Spence in the relation of this fact — the bees construct defences at the 
entrance to the hive, making the entrance too narrow for the moth to 
penetrate, but still capable of admitting all the bees themselves. These 
things are the results of instinct ; but if we do admit a low degree of intellect 
in the case of the inferior animals — and that is all that is required — we shall 
not at all trench on the higher points of man’s nature, for we should only 
be admitting that which has been spoken of as animal intelligence — that 
which Mr. Wainwright referred to under the phrase “ association of ideas,” 
but which after all is something more than mere memory. As an instance 
of what I mean, let me take a case at random. Take the case of a wasp 
which has attacked and killed a fly. He finds he cannot take it away bodily 
as it is, so he first takes off one wing and then another, and so on, removing 
the carcase piecemeal — 
Mr. Reddie. — I do not see how so light a thing as a fly’s wing would be 
sufficient to interfere with the successful carrying away of the whole 
body. 
The Chairman. — If the wasp were to endeavour to carry a fly with its 
wings upon it through any wind, it would be one of the most difficult things 
for it to accomplish — 
Mr. Reddie. — But how could you tell that’ the wings had not been 
“ fumbled ” off the fly’s body, and not taken off purposely at all ? 
The Chairman. — Because in such a case the wings show marks of 
excision by means of the wasp’s jaws. We should be careful to give 
sufficient allowance in our definitions, so as not to contradict that which is 
according to nature, and I think Mr. Morshead has scarcely done that. I 
am rather led myself by a valuable observation of Coleridge in his 
Aids to Reflection, in which he feels so strongly the force of the fact detailed 
by Hubert and other authorities with regard to the bee and the ant, and in 
which he states that the great distinction between man and the inferior 
animals is found in the possession by man of what you would call the 
religious faculty — of reason, not using the term in the sense of mere 
intelligence, but meaning by it the highest faculty which man possesses. 
He admits that, besides instinct, animals possess intelligence, but not reason, 
according to his definition of it. We are so accustomed, however, to use the 
terms “ reason ” and “ intelligence ” as synonymous, that it will perhaps be 
better if instead of using the word “ reason ” here, we substitute for it 
“ religious instinct,” although that is an unfortunate phrase in many respects. 
By the way, how very deficient we find language is when we want to express 
these subtle differences ! If we accept that definition, I think Mr. Row. and 
Mr. Wainwright and the rest of us would all be brought into complete 
accord upon the subject. There is a certain unfortunate vagueness about 
some parts of Mr. Morshead’s paper ; for it does seem to admit in one place 
a certain degree of intelligence in animals, and yet it seems to deny it in 
another. I think the terms “ instinct ” and “ memory ” are not sufficient to 
account for all that has been done by animals. Animals have an intelligence — 
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