193 
Mr. Laming lays it down, then, that all created things exist in God, and he 
goes on to say : — 
“ That matter can exist in space —which we should be inexact in calling an 
immaterial thing, as it is a simple negation of all things, whether material or 
immaterial — is easy to be understood.” 
Here is a great peculiarity. I cannot understand how space is “a simple 
negation of all things,’’ viewing it as a negation : — 
“ But to believe matter to be received into intellect or spirit is an incon- 
gruity, so long as we look upon matter as we now do.” 
This language seems to me to assign extension to spirit. “Matter to be 
received into spirit” makes extension an attribute of spirit; whereas, 
according to my conception, the idea of spirit involves the negation of exten- 
sion. We cannot get an idea of spirit if we attach extension to it. But 
here is something still more surprising: — 
“We cannot imagine any mind to be tenanted by the actual hard solids of 
Newton’s system.” 
I certainly cannot understand this desk getting into my mind, for instance. 
Of course the idea of it is in my mind, but that the actual desk itself should 
get there I cannot comprehend— — 
The Chairman. — It would be very inconvenient if it did. (Laughter.) 
Mr. Row. — Mr. Laming goes on ; and this is the surprising part : — 
“ If, then, the creation be in God, we must prepare to believe it to be 
only a mental conception, however real and material it may seem to us ; and 
that seeming reality we must account for.” 
Now, this is very serious. We come at once to the theory of Berkeley and a 
vast number of previous philosophers — among the Greeks of the pre-Socratic 
school — who deny the existence of the material universe. Considerable 
portions of the Platonic system are also founded on the same principle. 
There are certainly very powerful reasons to be urged against the existence 
of a material universe ; but, in spite of all the reasoning of Berkeley and 
others — in spite of all that may be found in Plato — I believe there is a 
material something in those objects which I see around me, and behind and 
above all the conceptions of those things which I have within the limits of 
my own mind. I do not deny the weight of the reasoning against this ; but, 
in spite of all the arguments, I say that God Almighty has so formed our 
minds that we cannot avoid believing in the existence of external matter, 
even as an objective thing. We cannot help believing in the objective reality 
of matter, notwithstanding all argument to the contrary. Again, Mr. Laming 
says : — 
“ Mind is capable of forming and retaining geometrical conceptions ; and 
there is no difficulty in concluding the power of the Almighty to be limited 
only by His will.” 
