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should do so. Then what follows ? Simply this, that God’s conceptions of 
His material universe are a part of my nature. Therefore I, in fact, see 
things with my bodily eyes as God sees them with His mind. It does not 
require much logic to show that the conclusion involved is that I am a part 
of God’s mind 
Mr. Reddie. — I do not think Mr. Laming means to go to that extent. 
Mr. Warington. — He would not tolerate that extension of his meaning, 
perhaps, but I say that the theory requires that extension. I would submit 
that any theory which says that material things exist only as conceptions in 
the mind of God must, if expanded to its logical boundaries, land us in 
simple Pantheism 
The Chairman. — I do not think that that is what Mr. Laming intends. 
Mr. Warington. — No, I dare say not. 
The Chairman. — Nor do I think his language admits that in theory. 
Mr. Reddie. — He has certainly said things which would contradict that 
view altogether. 
Mr. Warington. — Yes, but that only shows that he is inconsistent, 
for the doctrine admits of that extension. With regard to the origin 
of physical force, he says that it is only moral force altered in the particular 
respect that it becomes unchangeable. That implies that moral force is 
changeable 
Mr. Reddie. — I think he means spiritual or mental force, not moral force 
in an ethical sense. 
Mr. Warington. — It does not make the slightest difference. If he means 
mental, it includes what we call, distinctively, moral force. But surely 
moral force is as unchangeable and as invariable as physical force. Surely 
moral force changes no more than, and is as absolutely bounded by definite 
laws as, physical force. There really does not exist that difference which the 
author seems inclined to make in this respect. Then he speaks of ourselves 
having the power of changing moral force into physical force. He says, when 
a man’s mind wishes to raise a weight — the wish being the moral force — he 
puts forward the physical force which enables him to lift it ; and therefore 
the one force is the same as the other, only changed to a certain extent in its 
form. But he forgets that a man’s physical power is limited, while his moral 
power is unlimited. I can will to lift any force I please, and if moral force 
can be converted into physical force, my power should be as unlimited as my 
will. But that is not so. My physical power is totally distinct from my will 
and intention to do a certain thing : my will and intention simply direct the 
use of my physical power. And if a man stands in such a relation towards 
matter and force, this gives us no clue at all by which we can in any way 
conceive God’s relation towards matter and force. Our will avails itself of 
matter and force already existing to the hand ; His will calls things into 
existence. We have no power of that kind in our minds. It seems to me, 
therefore, that all comparison of our moral volition and physical force with 
God’s is entirely beside the mark, because the analogy fails in its most essen- 
tial point. Then as to the conservation of force. I have always understood 
