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and seem to me inconsistent with any practical belief in our 
responsibility. Let us hear him : — 
“ The doctrine of free-will (says he) rests on the metaphysical view of the 
supremacy of human consciousness. Each man, it is alleged, feels and knows 
that he is a free agent, nor can any subtleties of argument do away with our 
consciousness of possessing a free will. Now, the existence of this supreme 
jurisdiction, which is thus to set at defiance all the ordinary modes of reason- 
ing, involves two assumptions, of which the first, though possibly true, has 
never been proved, and the other is unquestionably false. These assumptions 
are that there is an independent faculty called consciousness, and that the 
dictates of that faculty are infallible.” 
Mr. Buckle makes some remarks on the uncertainty of our 
possession of such a faculty. He then resumes : — 
“We may in the second place reply, even if consciousness is a faculty, we 
have the testimony of all history to prove its extreme fallibility. All the 
great stages through which the progress of the civilization [I presume that the 
word here means improvement] of the human race has successively passed, have 
been characterized by certain mental peculiarities or convictions which have 
left their impress on the religion, the philosophy, and the morals of the age. 
Each of these convictions has been to one period a matter of faith, to an- 
other of derision, and each of them has in its own epoch been as intimately 
bound up with the minds of men, as is that opinion which we now term 
freedom of the will,” &c. (p. 12.) 
I find a difficulty in conceiving how a man of Mr. Bucklers 
reasoning powers could have written this passage. If I had 
time, I should demur to nearly every expression in it. 
First, I apprehend that in any strict meaning of language it 
is incorrect to designate consciousness a faculty. It possesses 
nothing by which those states of the mind which we call 
faculties are distinguished. It has no function. Conscience is 
correctly called a faculty ; but conscience and consciousness 
are two things entirely distinct. Every faculty must have a 
function. Conscience has a function. It determines right 
from wrong. But consciousness is simply the reflex action of 
the mind on itself. There is first the mental state of percep- 
tion ; then the consciousness of that perception ; and lastly, 
the concentration of the mind on that consciousness centring 
in our own individuality. 
I have often read of the supreme jurisdiction of conscience. 
It is so laid down by Butler. But in what sense consciousness 
can possess a supreme jurisdiction I am altogether at a loss to 
conceive. Between the nature of jurisdiction and the pheno- 
mena of consciousness there are no two points in common. 
It involves an unspeakable confusion of thought to speak 
