210 
of all consciousness as infallibly true. If such an assumption 
has been made, I agree with Mr. Buckle that it is utterly 
contradicted by facts. But to say that all consciousness is 
infallibly true is to confound between our consciousness of a 
perception, or a subject of thought, and the truth or false- 
hood of the perception or the thought — i.e., between conscious- 
ness and the object of consciousness. A man is conscious of 
whatever is passing in his own mind, whether it be true or 
false. Of this consciousness, and of its presence in the mind, 
he is infallibly certain. The thought, feeling, or conception is 
there, and he is conscious of its presence. This is true even 
of the dreams of a madman. He is infallibly certain that 
they are in his mind, though they are the delusions of a diseased 
brain. But this certainty has nothing to do with the object 
matter of the consciousness. 
It is difficult to attribute to a man of Mr. Buckle's mental 
powers the mistake of having confounded between the truth 
of our consciousness itself, and the object of our conscious- 
ness. But the language of the passage is hardly consistent 
with any other supposition ; and it is absolutely necessary 
that he should have done so if his reasoning is to have any 
reality against the doctrine of free-will. 
When we say that we have a direct consciousness of free- 
dom, we testify to the truth, not of a theory but of a fact. It 
is a matter of direct internal perception, of which I have a 
certainty closely approximating to that which I have of my 
own existence. It is closely connected with my perception of 
my self-conscious I, or of my personality. Every time I con- 
template myself in action , I become sensible of volition. 
Let us analyze its nature. I am infallibly certain that my 
coming here this evening was an act absolutely voluntary. 
Each stage of the process was subject to the control of my 
rational will. That will was acted on by motives. On these 
motives I exerted choice. With respect to each of them it 
was my purely voluntary act whether I would yield to it or 
not. At every period of the process, my action was purely 
voluntary. When I had come half or three-quarters of the 
distance, I am certain that I could have turned back ; and my 
doing so, or not, depended on an act of my will. My will 
was acted on by motives ; but it was in the power of my 
rational choice to contemplate one and to exclude another. I 
could not have prevented myself from coming, without sub- 
stituting some motive in the place of those by which my will 
has been influenced; but I am certain that it was a matter 
of my own voluntary choice whether I would or would not 
be here to-night. At this moment I am absolutely certain 
