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that it is a matter depending on my will whether I will or will 
not throw down this paper and read not another word. 
There is nothing of which I can be equally certain as of 
this. It possesses a similar certainty to that which I possess 
of my own existence. I am more certain of it than I am that 
the chairman is at this moment sitting in the chair. I have 
the testimony of my consciousness that I have a perception in 
my mind that he is doing so ; and of this I am infallibly 
certain. But there may be a doubt whether this conscious- 
ness is the correct representation of an external fact. 
But the consciousness of my own freedom represents 
nothing external to the mind. There is nothing objective 
in it; and consequently no room for doubt whether it con- 
veys a true representation of an external reality. It is 
the direct consciousness of an internal perception which I 
positively feel, and of that I am certain. I am not conscious 
whether any other man has freedom. My belief that he has 
is either inferential, or is founded on testimony. But to the 
certainty of my freedom, consciousness affords similar evidence 
to that which it does for the existence of my own personality. 
No evidence of any truth can possibly be stronger. To reject 
it is to rush into worse than Pyrrhonism. It is also indelibly 
impressed in the structure of language. It is impossible to 
contemplate myself in action without becoming conscious of 
the presence of a rational will, which is influenced by, but is not 
the slave of, the motives which act on it. It seems, therefore, 
scarcely credible that a writer of Mr. Buckle's powers should 
have confounded our rational self-conscious perception of 
freedom, which is indissolubly united with the perception of 
self as the independent centre of voluntary action, with the 
consciousness of any delusion which may enter into a diseased 
mind, and have put them on a par as an evidence of truth. 
But, if he is to be believed, the evidence supplied by con- 
sciousness to the truth of my voluntary agency is no stronger 
than that which foolish men and women have for the belief 
that it is unlucky for thirteen to sit down to a dinner-party, 
or for any other folly ; for he places our belief in our freedom 
on a level with those “ convictions which have left their 
impress on the religion, the philosophy, and the morals of 
the age. Each of these opinions," says he, “ has been at one 
time a matter of faith, and at another of derision ; and each 
of them has in its own epoch been as intimately bound up 
in the minds of men as is that opinion which men term 
freedom of the will." I need say no more. 
The philosophy of Mr. Buckle's work is vitiated by the 
rottenness of his first principles. We shall see that it is 
inconsistent with any rational belief in human responsibility. 
VOL. III. q 
