213 
But, important as the subject is, I must pass onwards. At 
page 1 7 Mr. Buckle observes : — 
“ The only positions which, at this stage of the inquiry, I shall expect 
the believer in the possibility of the philosophy of history to concede are 
the following: that when we perform an action, we perform it in conse- 
quence of some motive or motives ; that these motives are the results of 
some antecedents ; and if we were acquainted with the whole of the ante- 
cedents, and with all the laws of their movements, we should with unerring 
certainty predict the whole of their immediate results. If, for example, I 
am intimately acquainted with the character of any person, I can frequently 
tell how he will act under any given circumstances. Should I fail in my 
prediction, I must ascribe my error, not to any arbitrary or capricious free- 
dom of the will ; . . . but I must be content to suppose, either that I 
had been misinformed as to some of the circumstances, or else that I had 
not sufficiently studied the ordinary operations of his mind. If, however, I 
was capable of correct reasoning ; and if, at the same time, I had a correct 
knowledge both of his disposition and of the events by which he was sur- 
rounded, I should be able to foresee the line of conduct which, in consequence 
of these events, he would adopt.” 
I am far from being sure whether the knowledge which 
Mr. Buckle postulates in this passage as necessary for the 
completeness of philosophical history is not the special 
privilege of Omniscience, and cannot be possessed by any 
finite being. But, long as my quotation is, we must hear him 
to the end : — 
“Respecting the metaphysical dogma of free-will, and the theological 
dogma of predetermined events,* we are driven to the conclusion that the 
actions of men, being determined solely by their antecedents, must have 
a character of uniformity — that is to say, must, under precisely the same 
circumstances, always issue in precisely the same results. And as all ante- 
cedents are either in the mind or out of it, we see clearly that all the 
variations in the results — in other words, all the changes of which history is 
full ; all the vicissitudes of the human race ; their progress or their decay, 
their happiness or their misery — must be part of a double action ; an action of 
external phenomena on the mind, and another action of the mind on the 
phenomena.” 
I have made this long quotation for tbe purpose of pre- 
venting the possibility of misrepresenting tbe views of Mr. 
Buckle. To do him justice, he has fearlessly carried his 
* It should be observed that under the term Predestination, Mr. Buckle, 
and writers of kindred schools of thought, include what we mean by the 
ordinary providential action of Almighty God. 
