216 
distinct terms to designate distinct ideas is the fruitful source 
of endless confusion of thought. Nowhere is there equal 
danger of this confusion as in the philosophy of mind, 
owing to the fact that nearly every term which we are com- 
pelled to use in treating it, in its primary sense, is applicable 
to the world of matter. The plain fact is, a moral cause — or, 
as Mr. Buckle loves to call it, an antecedent — differs wholly 
from a physical one even in its conception. In speaking of 
ourselves as causes, we mean a wholly different thing from 
what we mean when we use the same term in relation to 
physical causation. The one always involves the idea of 
freedom and self- origination, which the other excludes. When 
I say that I am the cause of my actions, I mean a wholly 
different thing than when I say that a steam-engine is the 
cause of its results. The one may be a set of antecedents 
and consequents ; but to express the phenomena of the other 
by a similar term is to invite confusion of thought. 
No less clear is the distinction between motive and force ; 
though, owing to the imperfection of language, we are con- 
stantly speaking of the force of motives. To suppose that 
when we are speaking of the force of a steam-engine and 
when we are speaking of the force of a motive, we are speaking 
of things specifically the same, is the greatest of fallacies ; 
yet into fallacies of a similar kind there is no little danger 
of falling. All physical forces may be expressed by a common 
measure of quantity ; motives or moral forces cannot. Phy- 
sical forces compel; motives act on the rational will in a 
manner differing wholly from the idea of compulsion. They 
vary both in intensity and in character. 
I fully agree with Mr. Buckle, that motive of some kind is 
an antecedent of all human action. But it is not the only 
antecedent. To act without motive is impossible. Motives 
also are of the utmost variety in kind. One class is related to 
the lower portions of human nature ; another to our ration- 
ality ; another to the highest portions of our spiritual being. 
It is untrue to say that their power to command is a mere 
question of greater or less intensity. One of the higher 
motives is capable of influencing the mind against the much 
greater intensity of a lower one. For example, a man may 
be impelled by a strong desire for sensual indulgence, which, 
if allowed to be deeply meditated on, would propel him into 
intemperance. The higher will connected with the reason 
restrains it. The will presents a motive of a wholly different 
character to the contemplation of the mind. The voice of 
what we designate conscience makes itself audible, and the 
temptation is overcome. These latter influences differ from 
