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bend must be answered in favour of the influence of indivi- 
duality and of Divine Providence. What effect would have 
been produced on the world's history if Pausanias, instead of 
assassinating Philip, had, by mistake, assassinated Alexander ? 
Mistakes of this kind have been sometimes committed. What 
effect would have been produced on the development of the 
Greek mind, and by consequence on the whole course of 
modern civilization, if some stray missile had killed Themis- 
tocles at Artemisium ? The battle of Salamis would never 
have been fought, Greece would have been conquered by the 
Persians, and the whole course of civilization changed. What 
effect would have been produced on the modern world if the 
coachman of Napoleon the First had not been somewhat the 
worse for liquor, and, instead of driving his master furiously to 
the theatre, had driven at a more moderate pace ? In that 
case the explosion of the infernal machine would have taken 
place, not when the emperor was at a safe distance, but when 
he was within a few yards of it, and the course of modern 
history would have been different. Or, to take a more solemn 
subject, what would have been the effect on the whole course 
of European civilization (I speak in a human point of view) if 
the Apostle Paul had never set foot in Europe ? Would the 
course of human affairs have been the same if either of these 
events had happened differently ? If so, the providences of 
God and the individuality of man are appreciable factors in 
the sum total of the affairs of men ; and if we ignore their 
influence, a philosophical view of history is impossible. I do 
not wish to deny that the influences to which both these writers 
appeal are very weighty ones, but I except against the assump- 
tion that they are almighty, as wholly unphilosopkical. 
The principles laid down by Mr. Buckle often warrant far 
mure universal and necessary conclusions than he feels it con- 
venient to draw from them. In the passage which I have 
quoted, he tells us that “ if we knew the whole of the antece- 
dents and consequents, we could, with unerring certainty, 
predict the whole of their immediate results." This is a 
necessary conclusion from his premises. But a little further 
on he is content with a more humble result. “ If," says he, 
“ I am intimately acquainted with the character of a person, I 
can frequently tell how he will act under any given circum- 
stances." This latter assertion is unquestionably true. But 
the premises required, not that he should frequently tell, 
but that he should always tell unerringly. We come back to 
the old and well-established position of moral truth — a truth 
which, at any rate, is as old as Aristotle — and not to the new 
light of the Positive philosophy, that universal moral proposi- 
