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Mr. Warington.— Unquestionably. 
Rev. Dr. Irons. — Then, pardon me, but I do not see exactly what you are 
driving at. 
Mr. Warington. — I think the difficulty lies not so much in what I am 
driving at as in that against which I am driving 
Mr. Reddie. — May I ask you a question ? Would you be good enough to 
explain how you can at all exclude conscience from the argument ? 
Mr. Warington. — I only exclude it for the moment. I shall come to it 
again presently 
Mr. Reddie. — But the whole question really hinges upon it. 
Mr. Warington. — I will not omit it altogether. I think the difficulty 
which Dr. Irons experiences arises from this : the theory put before us speaks 
of desires or motives as one thing, and of the will as another thing. Now I 
submit that that distinction is one which you cannot possibly make 
The Chairman. — I think you have imported the word “ desire ” into the 
argument, Mr. Warington. 
Mr. Warington. — I am only battling against the theory that these 
desires or motives are separate from what I call my will ; I say there is no 
distinction between will and motive. The will, I contend, is not a separate 
faculty which weighs the motives against each other, but it is the simple re- 
sultant of all the various motives working in my nature, and therefore it is 
simply the same as the preponderating desires or motives. I do not wish to 
make any distinction myself. I am merely fighting against such a distinction 
being made 
Rev. C. A. Row. — I have used the .term “rational will” in my paper. 
Mr. Warington. — Now, this is the first step in my argument — that the 
will is not a separate faculty, but a whole mass of desires or motives working 
together. I have here no power which I can, properly speaking, call free. 
My nature is so constituted that when certain things are presented to it, 
those things, inevitably, by a law of my nature, call into being certain desires, 
and those desires will come to all men. It is inevitable that they should. 
I am quite aware that they do not come equally to all men, because characters 
and dispositions are different. I simply deal with man as we find him. So far 
as the lower part of man’s nature is concerned — what we may call man’s soul 
in distinction to the spirit — it consists of a number of senses capable of 
being acted upon by external circumstances and things, and, being so acted 
upon, these then become desires and fight against each other, and thus pro- 
duce in their action and reaction that which we call the will. We may for 
the purposes of illustration compare the mind of a human being to the House 
of Commons. You have a number of members, every one with his own wish 
and object to obtain, and they ultimately go to the vote, and the result is the 
will of the House — not a will distinct from the members who vote, but a will 
formed by the decision of the majority 
Rev. Mr. Greig. — May I ask, is not that will free ? 
Mr. Warington. — I submit that those desires are not free — they are 
bound in the way which Mr. Buckle has described. There is no physical 
compulsion of the will, but there is the compulsion of circumstances calling 
