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up certain desires. Is there any power in my nature capable of willing and 
controlling them ? If there is, I am free ; if I can show that there is a faculty 
above them all in me, then I am free. Now, there is a faculty in man which 
claims to do it, and that faculty is conscience ; but I submit that conscience 
has not the power to do what it thus claims. Sometimes, indeed, conscience 
seems to have the power, because it is able to call up and set in motion other 
desires of the lower man which will counterbalance those already in motion. 
A man desires to commit a theft, but the voice of conscience tells him that 
that is wrong, and stops him by calling to mind the punishment which will 
ensue if he carries out his desire. In that case the desire to avoid the punish- 
ment is greater than the desire to thieve. It is not that conscience alone has 
the power, but conscience calls up another power which really effects the work. 
A man drives a number of horses attached to a coach, with reins for each 
horse. If he had no power over the reins you would say he had no power 
over the horses. If he guided them merely by holding a bundle of hay 
before them you would not say he had much power over them, and that is 
very much the same sort of power that conscience has over the human soul, 
merely calling desires into action, but having no real power to control them. 
The Apostle Paul’s conscience was of this kind. He desired to do that which 
was good, but he could not do what he wished. He was the slave of his 
human nature. But you will say, “ Here is still a consciousness within 
myself that I am free, and need not do anything unless I like. Here is a 
sense of responsibility.” Precisely so : this sense of responsibility is the key 
to the whole position. This sense of responsibility shows that there is some 
restrictive voice within us telling us what is right and what is wrong, and 
so convincing us that the reason for doing wrong is in ourselves. Man falls, 
and the fault is in himself, and yet he cannot help it, which shows at once 
the fact that conscience has not the power it ought to have. Yet still is he 
responsible, for it is his own nature that makes him do wrong. But our con- 
science, or our sense of responsibility, does not stop there. It tells us also 
that we might have done something different from what we did, and I con- 
ceive that that is to be explained on a far higher ground than any Buckle 
has thought of, or than we have heard hinted at in Mr. Bow’s paper. Man 
is conscious that there is a power within his reach that would enable his 
conscience to be the master, but that power does not lie in himself — it is far 
above him. Man is conscious of that intuitively. It is one of the instincts 
implanted in his nature that there is a divine power hovering about him, and 
which, if he grasps it, will make his conscience master of his whole nature. 
Then, if he grasps that spirit of God above him, he ceases to be a slave, — he 
is free. He is no longer a slave to sin and his own desires — he is free. In 
no other sense is man free. He has freedom within his grasp, he can choose 
it, he can stretch out the hand of faith and clasp it if he will, and so become 
master of himself. Man can refuse the proffered freedom if he will : he did 
refuse it once, and he fell ; but by clasping it again he rises. And there is 
the responsibility. He can refuse to take that help from God which he feels 
so near him, and so he may allow his lower nature to be master ; but on the 
other hand he may accept that help 
