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Mr. Reddie.- — Which you admit he is free to take. 
Mr. Warington. — Yes, which he is perfectly free to take, and therefore 
in that sense, and in that sense only, man is free. With Divine help he may 
be free in everything ; without it he is free in nothing. I differ in toto from 
Buckle’s conclusions on that point, although I admit a vast number of his 
premises, because he has ignored the essential point of man’s conscience and 
its contact with God’s spirit. St. Paul says, “ Oh, wretched man that I am ! 
who shall deliver me from this bondage ? ” and again, “ I thank God, through 
Jesus Christ.” Pie felt the bondage and he found the freedom. I do not 
therefore deny freedom to man, for I admit his full freedom in one particular, 
which, if only used aright, would give freedom to his whole nature in the 
truest and highest sense possible. 
Rev. Dr. Irons.— I do not intend to neglect altogether the observations of 
Mr. Warington, but I think it is a preliminary duty to lead back our 
thoughts to the paper which has been read, and which was not wholly con- 
fined to the question of the freedom of the human will. The paper deals with 
the philosophy of Mr. Buckle as well as with certain propositions contained 
in his works. All the reviews which have handled the remarkable books of 
Mr. Buckle have failed to notice their connection with that movement in 
France, and existing to a less extent in England, known as the “ Positive 
Philosophy ” movement. Mr. Buckle appears to have been an exponent of 
the principles of M. Auguste Comte with reference to his historical hypo- 
theses. Man’s whole history is such a concatenation of events that it could 
not have been other than it was, says M. Comte ; and, in order to prove that, 
it was the intention of Mr. Buckle to construct a history of civilization on 
a gigantic scale ; and nothing but the fact that Providence cut short Mr. 
Buckle’s career arrested the progress of that work. But, to carry out his 
principles of history, he was bound to encounter the theory of human free- 
will. On that point Comte parted company with some of his distinguished 
disciples. He began his system without intending, so far as I can see, to 
construct a new religion — what is called “ the religion of humanity.” But 
Buckle’s History of Civilization was to be the development of Comte’s 
whole theory ; and it was therefore necessary for him to deal with the fact 
that man is supposed to have a will. He, therefore, lavs down this proposi- 
tion, that there is no such thing as will possible, because order and law pre- 
clude the idea of that variability which is included in the idea of will. He 
not merely denies the freedom of the will, but he denies its existence ; and not 
merely the existence of variability or will in man, but even in God ; — and 
from that Comte proceeds to deny the being of a God. Mr. Buckle seems 
to hesitate as to accepting that conclusion, but he adopts all Comte’s 
premises which lead up to it ; and in the same way we find that many of the 
followers of Comte, and companions of Buckle, adopt the same class of pre- 
mises, while arriving at somewhat divergent conclusions. For example, 
the Duke of Argyll, whom we may consider as a sort of follower of both 
Comte and Buckle, hesitates to adopt their conclusions ; and his book on 
The Reign of Law falls very far short of the views of the more advanced 
