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Positivists. So, again, Mr. Lewes adopts the former part of the philosophical 
and historical theory which Buckle was working out ; but he stops abruptly, 
and rejects with something like scorn the theory of a religion of humanity. 
There is no such thing as a consistent follower of Comte ; but there is a large 
number of quasi-philosophers who adopt those principles of Comte which 
cannot but lead to a denial of the existence of free will both in man and in 
God. Mr. Row a little offended me in his paper, by conceding rather too 
much to Mr. Buckle at the outset. He conceded, with a facility that gave 
full scope to Mr. Warington’s argument afterwards, that we really are impelled 
by motives, that they always go before, and are not merely our reasons, and 
that they have thus a distinct power as entities acting upon us. I have an 
objection to the use of abstract terms on such a point. We talk of memory 
and reflection. But my mind is no more made up of memory and reflection, 
than my leg is made up of walking and running. I am not something made 
up of memory, and of other faculties — I am a single being, a unit. What 
a thought is before I think it I do not know. Man is, in short, an intelligent 
cause of action ; and it is misleading to take certain useful abstractions, which 
are harmless and necessary in ordinary conversation, in order to construct 
a philosophical theory upon them, when those abstractions will not bear 
critical analysis in the manner in which they are applied. Mr. Row con- 
cedes that motives act upon human beings. Now, I say I never was acted 
upon by a motive. All these abstractions are merely convenient terms for 
describing the mind of man acting in a certain direction. Mr. Row quotes 
from Mr. Buckle : — 
“ The only positions which, at this stage of the inquiry, I shall expect the 
believer in the possibility of the philosophy of history to concede are the 
following : that when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of 
some motive or motives”; (what rubbish!) “that these motives are the 
results of some antecedents ; and if we were acquainted with the whole of the 
antecedents, and with all the laws of their movements, we should with un- 
erring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results. If, for 
example, I am intimately acquainted with the character of any person, I can 
frequently tell how he will act under any given circumstances.” (Here he 
has got a truth : common sense will speak out now and then.) “ Should I 
fail in my prediction, I must ascribe my error, not to any arbitrary or capri- 
cious freedom of the will ” ; (why capricious freedom of the will ? ) . . . “ but 
I must be content to suppose, either that I had been misinformed as to some 
of the circumstances, or else that I had not sufficiently studied the ordinary 
operations of his mind. If, however, I was capable of correct reasoning, and 
if, at the same time, I had a correct knowledge both of his disposition and of 
the events by which he was surrounded, I should be able to foresee the line 
of conduct which, in consequence of these events, he would adopt.” 
Poor man ! Yet I suppose his friends think him a sound and deep thinker ! 
We now pass from Buckle’s theory of the will, which is hopelessly encumbered 
with the notion that abstract ideas have a concrete existence, and so act upon 
the man, to Aristotle’s seventh book of Ethics ; and here I must thank Mr. 
Row very much for referring to that. I believe that book is one of the most 
perfect pieces of composition in the world. It has its faults ; but we must bear 
VOL. III. S 
