395 
does this without any risk of “ eating the Christian religion 
up.” But as I am concerned with the interactions and rela- 
tions of ethical philosophy, it is no business of mine here to 
notice Dr. Tyndall's remarks upon the ethical features of a 
miracle, nor the argument from ethical considerations in favour 
of miracles, nor yet to point out the illegitimacy of his criti- 
cism, which substitutes the word “ doubtful ” for the word 
“ invisible,” and then proceeds to argue upon the change of 
terms, as if it were warrantable. My present object is simply 
to show how the different faculties or powers of human nature 
are called into exercise by the different kinds of objective 
truths that interlace and confront us as we contemplate, very 
frequently, one fact or event as that of a miracle. This shows 
the interactions and relations of what is ethical, that “ all 
things are double (as said the Son of Sirach), one against 
another.” 
And as facts , viewed in their isolated character, present 
this complication of truths, it is the same with law in its inter- 
lacings and workings. Each separate branch of philosophy 
has, of course, its own S3^stem of laws ; yet law, in the sense of 
order, may be said to be common to all branches of philosophy. 
There is an order of thought as well as an order of material 
sequence. And there is also an order of wisdom, purity, and 
rectitude. When I have spoken of miracles as coming under 
a system of moral law, I have been asked, “ Do you in fact use 
the term law in the same sense as when you speak of 
physical law ? ”* and I am bound to say that I do. Law denotes 
order , not force, and it is common to all branches of philosophy, 
metaphysical, moral, and material. It is, in fact, only through 
material organization and arrangement that moral truth is 
made intelligible to man. Every one truth is connected with 
some other truth, and every distinct law in nature has its re- 
lation to some other law, and so each system of laws appears 
to bear an appointed relation to the universal cosmos. Every 
result, therefore, in nature may be regarded as the consequence 
of a balancing of contrariant forces. That which comprehends 
all things is not the science of the Positivist, but the philo- 
sophy of the metaphysician. Metaphysical philosophy has to 
do with the wdiole of things, their principles and causes ; it 
seeks to blend into a harmonious whole that which is common 
to all branches of philosophy, but peculiar to none. Hence it 
was justly termed, in ancient times, the first or universal 
philosophy. 
But the interactions and relations of ethical philosophy 
* Journ. of Trans, of the Victoria Institute, vol. ii. p. 202. 
Vol. in. 2 u 
