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rather than a prior office in our moral perceptions. And for 
this reason, if virtue as an object be presented to the mind 
as an individual thing, and not as a general notion, then it 
must be cognizable by some proper sense and not by the 
reason or intellect, for reason implies an exercise of thought. 
Virtue as an individual thing, to come within the field of 
possible experience, would seem to require a moral sense to 
discern it, just as colour requires the sense of sight to perceive 
it. When it has been seen or perceived, virtue no doubt 
may give rise to comparison and general notions, and so 
provide material for the exercise of the reason; but the 
question is, how is virtue as an object perceived in the first 
instance ? Can the reason grasp an external object without 
a proper sense to bring it within its reach ? Ideas of right 
and wrong are simple and intuitive, they provide materials 
for the exercise of reason ; but it seems to me that without an 
intuitive moral faculty we could never have such ideas at all. 
In our moral researches, therefore, I should feel disposed to 
assign to the reason an office posterior to that of a moral 
sense. Conscience includes both, no doubt ; but feeling takes 
precedence of the reason in its exercise, rather than the reason 
precedence of feeling. 
THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF HUMAN ACTION. 
The appetites, desires, affections, &c., forming that part of 
human nature called the sensitivity, were designed to be under 
the direction and control of reason and conscience. Yet these 
springs and guides are also dependent upon the will as the 
last link in the chain of intention and the first of action. But 
what is volition ? how comes it to pass ? Do the sensitivity 
and intellect invariably guide and necessitate the will? We 
are supplied with motives through the sensitivity. We acquire, 
retain, and extend our knowledge through the intellect. In 
what, then, consists the act of volition ? How stands the 
will in its relations to the sensitivity and intellect ? Is it 
controlled ? or does it control ? Is it in bonds ? or does it 
act freely ? 
There is law, doubtless, an order of working, in the realm 
of mind, as well as in the world of matter. Indeed the two 
worlds are here very wonderfully connected. Material organ- 
ization is made not only to assist the operations of mind, 
but the faculties of mind depend upon material organization 
for the performance of their functions. The power of mind is 
