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found to be commensurate with tlie strength or degree of cere- 
bral organization. Yet thought is not cerebration, but some- 
thing which runs along b}^ means of it. Sensation is distinct 
from the “ sensory ganglia 33 or nerves, yet it is made possible 
through them as instruments. The mind or soul is made to 
depend upon physical conditions, and the slightest disarrange- 
ment in our material economy may derange the whole of our 
mental operations, and throw the laws of the human soul into 
confusion. But nothing is hereby proved, nor even sug- 
gested, as to the non-existence of soul as a distinct part of 
man. Confusion may take the place of order, but this proves 
nothing against, if it does not in favour of, the soul’s separate 
existence. The will, which has been termed the efficient 
cause of action, like other parts of the human constitution, 
has its relations to the whole framework. What are these 
relations ? Much controversy has been excited by this 
question. Indeed, the difficulties suggested by the Will 
and its relations to the human framework, have been increased, 
by adding to them the further difficulty of reconciling the 
foreknowledge of God (which is a distinct question altogether) 
with human freedom, supposing it to exist. Predestination 
has been linked with the problem of free-will, and these 
together have supplied Mahometans, Jews, philosophers, and 
divines, in ancient and modern times, with matter of conten- 
tion that has been pronounced inexhaustible. That motives 
act upon the will is a fact as certain as that wo have springs 
of action within us. To deny this would be to render a 
philosophy of ethics impossible. 
The forces or motives acting* upon the will are various in 
nature and in their degrees of strength. The aggregate of 
these forces, or motives, which are all but endless in number 
and variety, may be said to move the will to action. We 
know not their number, we see not their character, and there- 
fore we cannot estimate their resultant force or direction. 
Not that such force or direction is to be calculated as forces 
in mechanics, else we might suppose a person impelled by a 
given weight or number of motives to go a certain distance in 
one direction, say to the north, while an equal weight or 
number of motives were pulling him in another direction, 
say to the east ; in which case he would exhibit the singular 
perverseness of obeying nothing and nobody, by walking 
straight off in a diagonal, halfway between the two points, 
towards which we have supposed him at the same time to be 
impelled. There is a difference between mechanics and living 
agency. The law of necessity is admitted to guide things 
without life ; the law of freedom, it is contended, guides 
