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and putting down motives at will — " he keeps the door of 
his thoughts ” ; his thoughts or motives do not keep him — 
that is to say, he has control over his motives ; his motives do 
not control him, which is all the freedom that is contended 
for. 
But it is said, “ the will can only choose among those 
motives which are presented to it, or which it has the power 
of presenting to itself.” Choice , however, in any form, implies 
freedom , and the freedom of choice here is wide, for this 
“power of presenting to himself motives,” which man has, is 
incalculable, if not unlimited. 
But if we could calculate, it seems to be put hypothetically, 
the number and weight of motives which are “ presented,” 
and which man has the “ power of presenting to himself,” 
then volitions could be foreseen, and we could calculate the 
course of conduct that would follow. If we could tell before- 
hand how a man would reason with himself, what motives he 
would dismiss, what he would call up, no doubt we could tell 
how he would act. But wh y not say, in plain language, that 
if we knew beforehand what his course of conduct would be, 
we could tell other people what it would be ? This is all the 
argument really amounts to. 
So hard, however, is it for man to be reasonable when he 
undertakes to discuss free will, that the Duke of Argyll has 
actually said, that in calling up one motive and putting down 
another, man is “ impelled by something which in itself is only 
another motive , and so it is true that our wills can never be 
free from motives, and in this sense can never be free from 
law.” Jonathan Edwards would have an “ antecedent voli- 
tion ” to produce every given volition, and so on to all eternity. 
The Duke of Argyll first invests man with the power of calling 
up one motive, putting down another, making a “ choice ” or 
“ selection ” from those which remain, and I had fancied that 
this was freedom ; but it now seems that “ selection 33 was not 
what we ordinarily mean by that word, for man was “ impelled 33 
to “ select 33 or “ choose ” by something else, “ which in itself is 
only another motive.” This is tiresome, like most arguments 
in a vicious circle ; and I do think his Grace, in the next edition 
of his Reign of Law } should define his terms and use them 
consistently. Ho is very hard upon Mr. J. S. Mill, for “am- 
biguities and obscurities of language,” — is it unreasonable to 
ask what an “ impelled 33 “ choice 33 or “ selection 33 of motives 
was intended to mean ? — and if in “ selecting ” or “ choosing” 
one motive in preference to another, if in dismissing this and 
calling up that, if in “ keeping the door of his thoughts,” man 
is really “impelled 33 by “ something else,” is it too much to 
