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of virtue ; but it should be observed that Greek philosophy uses the term 
virtue in a more extended sense than we do. The Greeks, for instance, 
might have spoken of the virtue of that pen, or of the virtue of that table. 
In Greek that would be quite correct ; but it is not so with us. I think moral 
philosophy may be more naturally defined as being the philosophy of the 
activities of man, and I think the range of moral philosophy is exceedingly 
extensive. I quite agree with Mr. English in his remarks upon the slight 
extent to which the study of moral philosophy is pursued at our universities. 
I think it is a sad thing that it should be so little studied in this country, 
and I feel great wonder that at the only place where moral philosophy is 
practically studied — the University of Oxford — it has made so very little 
progress for many years. I speak of it, remember, in the sense of Christian 
moral philosophy, because I am afraid that all existing theories of moral 
philosophy are sadly deficient in embracing the great facts of revealed 
religion. Now, just let me notice two points of deficiency. The ancient 
moral philosophy is a portion of politics, and the ancient philosophers could 
not take any other view of it because they had no data for doing so. So 
far they were right, but in the Christian religion moral philosophy has attained 
a very much higher realization, and yet I do not find in any existing treatise 
any distinct recognition of the Church of Christ as a great phenomenon in 
moral philosophy. Since the days of Butler, Christian moral philosophy has 
made no progress whatever. Another point in which Christian moral philo- 
sophy is lamentably defective is found in this, that it has taken, and does 
take, no account of the most powerful of all moral influences, the great 
Christian principle of faith ; and I use the word faith in a wider and more 
extended sense than that in which the author of this paper has used it. 
There is one strong point in every system of moral philosophy, and that is 
the immense power of habit upon human nature. But to effect changes 
through the principle of habit is a very slow process ; and if our only hope 
of making the world better depends on acting on the state of moral cor- 
ruption by habit, we shall find ourselves in a very bad state. In his 10th 
book Aristotle tells us, with a certain degree of pathos, what he thought 
would be the result of his treatise, and his only hope was to act upon a 
few select spirits : — the human race, the great mass of mankind, he felt 
himself utterly powerless to deal with. That is the simple result of 
the mere principle of habit, as Aristotle contemplated it. Now, our 
Lord, in building up His Church, certainly did intend to act on human 
nature by the principle of faith. I apprehend that He looked upon tbe 
great principle of faith as being that by means of which man can be made 
better ; and He proceeded in His work, beginning with the intellect, through 
the principles of faith, and getting down into the heart. But that principle 
is altogether ignored by every system of moral philosophy with which I am 
acquainted. Nothing would be more valuable, and nothing would more 
effectually dissipate scepticism than honestly investigating many subjects 
where Christianity has stirred the profound depths of humanity, and seeing 
how far it is adapted to the moral nature of man. A few months 
