418 
ago, while in the British Museum, I looked over all the recent 
editions of Aristotle, to see whether anything had been added in recent 
years. I examined them with considerable attention, but I failed to 
find in any of the commentators of the last twenty years any ideas drawn 
from Christianity. I looked at Grant, but I did not find any enlarged 
views connecting religion with moral philosophy ; and I found that, prac- 
tically, since the days of Butler, we had made no progress in harmo- 
nizing the revelation of God with the moral nature of man. I feel that 
the whole Christian Church suffers an enormous loss from this, and Mr. 
Mill would not have said such foolish things as he has done if it had been 
otherwise. I very cordially agree, therefore, with that paragraph of Mr. 
English’s paper, which deals with the slight extent which moral philosophy 
is taught in this country. In another passage Mr. English speaks of Aris- 
totle’s division of the mind of man, and here I think is the weakest point 
of Aristotle’s mode of procedure in founding any portion of his moral 
philosophy on arbitrary divisions of that description. Moral philosophy, 
if good for anything, must be founded on the facts of human nature, in- 
cluding those acted upon by revelation. As far as human nature is acted 
upon by revelation, the investigation of it comes under the principles of 
moral philosophy. But I very much doubt whether that portion of 
Aristotle is not the weakest of his whole system. Mr. English, in another 
passage, says : — “The springs of action excited, it is the office of the 
higher powers to regulate human conduct, reason giving to man a sense 
of prudence, enabling him, that is, to select right means, and con- 
science giving to him a sense of duty, or aiding him in the selection 
of right ends.” I presume that in that passage the author means by 
“ prudence,” the (ppovr]m^ of Aristotle. Now I have given long and deep 
attention to this subject, and I believe that the 6th book of Aristotle’s 
Ethics is exceedingly defective in its analysis of the intellect of man, in 
relation to his moral character. I believe that Mr. English has adopted 
throughout the views of “the Ethics” upon this point, which very much 
narrows the action of man’s reason upon his moral nature. In one 
word, the author in his subsequent pages implies that the intellect always 
follows, and does not precede moral action. Now I entirely dispute the 
truth of that. I mean to say that in every act of faith the intellect goes 
first. I use the word in a wide sense, and include the whole of our rational 
powers. It is difficult to speak accurately when using the terms “ intellect ” 
and “ reason ” ; but I hold that the author has taken much too narrow a 
view of the action of the intellect upon the moral nature of man. Mr. 
English goes on to say : — “ Ideas of right and wrong are simple and intuitive. 
They provide materials for the exercise of reason ; but it seems to me that 
without an intuitive moral faculty we could never have such ideas at all.” 
But I apprehend that reason is directly and closely connected with almost 
every one of our moral actions in a much wider sense than is admitted here. 
With very much of what the author says under the head of “ the efficient 
cause of human action” I cordially agree, for it virtually embodies 
