430 
goes on to suggest, “ if there be any other virtue or aught else praiseworthy, to 
think of these things.” But in the paper before us, it seems as if there were 
some question raised as to whether there be any such thing as virtue at all ! I 
certainly think that we should have Scriptural texts more carefully used, if 
used at all. Then there are some phrases used by Mr. English which have 
puzzled, me not a little. I was not so much puzzled about “ sensitivity ” 
as Dr. Irons seemed to have been, because I think I know what is meant by 
the term, but the phrase “ presentative faculties ” puzzled me considerably. I 
am not sure what faculties are to be called presentative, because whenever I 
think, I have something before my mind, and I apprehend all our faculties 
come into that category. But no doubt Mr. English will be able to throw 
some light upon the point in his reply. But I will not proceed any further with 
this minute criticism. I will only take now one or two of the more important 
points. And I come first to that passage where Mr. English seems to me to 
press Professor Tyndall — I have no doubt, without any intention of unfairly 
pressing him, — and he seems to consider him as saying something bad when he 
is really saying something good. He quotes this passage from Professor 
Tyndall : — “ The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration 
of sequences in nature. The further question intrudes itself with resistless 
might— whence comes this sequence ? What is it that binds the consequent 
with its antecedent in nature 1 The truly scientific intellect never can attain 
rest until it reaches the forces by which the observed succession was pro- 
duced.” Now, I consider that is a positive acknowledgment on the part of 
a distinguished scientific philosopher that the sceptical theory of Hume, that 
all things in nature were merely a series of sequences, is not true. I was 
glad to welcome that acknowledgment, and I do not know why Mr. 
English is not satisfied with it. He says: — “I have a fair-haired boy of 
five whom I feel in danger of regarding as ‘ truly scientific,’ for he bothers 
my very life out to know the cause of everything.” Well, my answer to 
that is, that the man is the same as the child, only with a larger experience. 
It is an astonishing thing how early children begin to reason ; and I should 
be sorry to think there is a line drawn between the philosophical mind and 
the child’s mind — in fact, I am inclined to believe that the more philosophical 
the more childlike. I repeat that I do not understand why Mr. English is 
not satisfied with this admission of Professor Tyndall’s. I was glad to see 
it, for I thought it was anti-Positivist, and not atheistic at all. Then Mr. 
English goes on to the question “ what is force ? ” and on the next page, 
with a mark of admiration, he says : — “ Force ! why who has ever tried to 
conceive what this word can mean, further than his own conscious efforts of 
volition, as by a sort of figure, enable him '? ” But any one who feels a stone 
fall upon him has a strong impression of force without any conscious effort 
of volition. The reflex action is a different and subsequent operation of the 
mind. Any one who feels the weight of a stone which falls upon him must 
be impressed with the notion of being weighed down, and although I have 
no doubt he will believe that the blow must be due to some preceding force 
that caused it, still that is not the first thing in his mind. I wish Mr. 
