478 
negative — that which denies limitation to His Being. But 
every positive conception of being which we can frame, can 
only be imaged to our minds under the aspect of finiteness. 
Can we by any mental process frame any conception of the 
infinite as it exists in God ? I apprehend not. In speaking 
of God as infinite, all that I can distinctly image to the mind 
is some finite conception which I deny to form the limits of 
His Being. My positive conception of Him is, that He is 
that finite conception plus something more devoid of limits, 
which I do not know. In the existence of such a being I 
believe ; but it is impossible to say with any degree of correct- 
ness that I can frame a distinct conception of His nature. 
By the term believe, I mean that there are certain laws of 
mind which compel me to assume that such a being exists. 
Beyond this I cannot go. 
Dean Mansel and Sir W. Hamilton represent that our belief 
in an infinite Being is the peculiar province of a function of 
the mind, which they designate faith, as a power distinct from 
reason. I am unable to acquiesce in this distinction. Every 
act of faith, nay, the one in question, is essentially rational. 
Faith is the final result of every one of our mental processes, 
when we have arrived at the point at which we make a 
distinct affirmation. Why the principle of faith should be 
limited to the admission of the existence of that which we 
cannot conceive I cannot see ; and, above all, how such an act 
can be viewed otherwise than an act of our reason. Faith is not 
only an act of our reason, but frequently of our highest reason. 
I ask. Are not our greatest acts of faith in the highest degree 
rational ? Is not the act of the martyr standing voluntarily at 
the stake a most genuine act of faith ? Are not his convic- 
tions in the highest sense rational ones ? I admit that there 
is an aspect of faith which may be said to be instinctive. The 
belief of a child in his mother is such. But there are two 
others both rational ones. One is that which we designate 
by the term trust. This is an act founded on our reason ; as, 
for example, our trust in God. The second is the final result of 
the reasonings and rational processes of our minds. The affir- 
mation of the truth of our conclusions is followed by an act of 
faith. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews designates 
our belief in the being of a God as an act of faith. This is 
surely a conclusion of our reason. — In treating of the moral 
attributes of God, Dean Mansel appears to me to have pressed 
his premises beyond their legitimate conclusions. I should 
raise the question with him whether they are rightly conceived 
of as infinite? He has here given Mr. Mill a considerable 
advantage over him. The term Infinite can only properly be 
