481 
disclose, we must assign a limit to the powers of reason, not 
on the ground that we are unable to attain a clear conception 
of the nature of the moral attributes of the Creator, but be- 
cause, as in man, they each limit one another^ action, and the 
infinitude of His wisdom alters the mode of their manifesta- 
tion, compared with the mode which would be dictated by the 
finite wisdom of man. — A large mass of the phenomena of 
the universe afford us unquestionable proofs of the benevo- 
lence of the Deity. The only mode of evading the force of 
these is by denying the existence of design in creation. A 
subordinate class, viewed by themselves, present us with 
another aspect. They cannot be ascribed to benevolence, ex- 
cept on the supposition of a deficiency in power. There is 
only one solution open, but that is a very satisfactory one. 
We have not the whole case before us, and it is reasonable to 
suspend our judgments until we have, and abide by that 
evidence which really preponderates. A child forms a very 
different conception of what is a truly benevolent action from 
a full-grown man. To a child a flogging may seem a high 
act of cruelty. To a wise man it may appear as the highest 
manifestation of benevolence; still it is impossible that the 
child can view the act as benevolent, as long as he is only 
capable of contemplatiug it as cruel. The answer to the diffi- 
culty is, the ignorance of man. — I therefore class the idea of the 
infinite among the transcendental conceptions of the human 
mind, which, owing to their indistinctness and indefiniteness, 
only admit of predication to so limited an extent, that they are 
incapable of becoming the subjects of reasoning. They may 
be regarded as belonging to a numerous class of subjects 
which, in relation to our present faculties, are neither true nor 
false, but nullities. Of this kind are multitudes of those 
conceptions by the aid of which certain classes of thinkers 
have endeavoured to penetrate the regions of ontology, and 
especially those which are peculiar to the transcendental 
philosophy, which have been the same in character both in 
ancient and modern times. The Timceus of Plato is a com- 
plete magazine of conceptions of this description ; so also are 
the writings of the Alexandrian philosophy, of German trans- 
cendentalism and mystical theology. My mind at least is inca- 
pable of realizing the conceptions of these philosophers. This 
may be owing to my stupidity. If so, it is a consolation to know 
that it is one which I share with all but a very select portion of 
mankind; and my scepticism leads me to think that those per- 
sons who imagine that they are able to grasp these classes of 
conceptions, so as to make them subjects of positive thought, 
are under a delusion. They appear to me to have fallen 
