485 
true that the subjects of revelation must lie within the powers 
of reason to apprehend, it by no means follows that they may 
not run up into matters which transcend those powers ; pre- 
cisely in the same manner as while the objects of creation 
are perfectly comprehensible, many of them involve ques- 
tions, as we have already seen, quite beyond the powers of 
reason to fathom. A mystery is a truth, which, as far as it is 
revealed, is comprehensible ; as far as it is not revealed, runs 
into unknown depths. 
Another distinction also should not be forgotten. Reason 
may be quite capable of distinctly understanding a truth when 
revealed, which it would have been impotent or only imperfectly 
able to discover. Multitudes can understand the Newtonian 
philosophy, who would have been unable to have elaborated it. 
Those who argue that a divine revelation was unnecessary 
because many of its truths might have been found out without 
it, forget this, which, when thus stated, seems to be like a 
simple truism. 
It follows, therefore, that the opposition which we so often 
hear spoken of as existing between reason and revelation, 
is utterly untenable. So it seemed to the great defender 
of Christianity in the last century. Bishop Butler. “I ex- 
press myself with caution,” says he, “ lest I should be 
supposed to vilify reason, which is the only faculty we have, 
wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation 
itself.” And again, “ Reason ought to judge, not only of 
the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of 
Revelation.” The opposition exists, not between reason and 
revelation, but between revelation and the imperfect use of 
reason. To revile reason, because it is liable to error, or 
because it is capable of abuse, is much the same thing as it 
would have been to have reviled the supernatural gifts of 
the Spirit, because, as St. Paul expressly tells us, they were 
partial in their operation, and admitted of abuse on the part of 
those who possessed them. 
But it will be said, reason has questioned both the truths and 
the fact of revelation itself ; and has pronounced them incre- 
dible, on the ground that they disagree with the conclusions 
of reason. I answer, that this assertion is hopelessly ambi- 
guous : human reason here means the reason of some particular 
men, which may be very imperfect. My eyes lead me some- 
times into mistakes, those of others which are diseased furnish 
but very imperfect information ; but this is no reason why we 
should follow the example of CEdipus, and extinguish them. 
If certain things in revelation contradict certain convictions of 
my reason, this forms a good ground for calling into active 
