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facts, principles, doctrines, and so on. So much for the first point. Then 
I do not quite apprehend the relations of faith and reason as put by Mr. Row. 
I find him saying, — 
“ Faith is the final result of every one of our mental processes, when we 
have arrived at the point at which we make a distinct affirmation.” 
Now I should suppose that that sentence required “judgment” or “conclu- 
sion ” to be substituted for “ faith ” : — faith is a precedent condition. Even 
mathematical deduction presupposes intuitive evidence ; and what is intuitive 
evidence but the evidence of faith ? Take the case of visual conception as 
applied to St. Paul’s Cathedral as an illustration. If we limit ourselves to 
the original act of conception, do we see St. Paul’s in all its amplitude ? 
No. We have a very small picture on the retina, half an inch, more or less, 
in extent. Yet no one who looks at St. Paul’s doubts that he sees that 
cathedral in all its amplitude, in all its beauty, in all its proportions as it 
truly appears, just as though he had climbed all over the whole building 
and measured every inch with a foot-rule. Now if you analyze that, you 
cannot say that perception is a mere act of the sense of vision — it is much 
more an act of faith upon that sense. We must not restrict faith, I take it, 
merely to the apprehension of spiritual objects and their divine relation : 
there is a much larger meaning than that to be attributed to the word. In 
order to make good this position, let me ask what is faith ? Is it not the 
unity of sense and reason ? Take an illustration of what I mean. You 
cannot analytically determine the relation of a part to the whole, and say 
“ the whole is greater than a part,” until you first synthetically take the 
whole. That is our attitude in regard to divine revelation. We must first 
be content to put ourselves reverentially, devoutly, and loyally on the 
affirmative side, and then we may discursively and analytically examine into 
the whole depth and length and breadth. And here I would make a passing 
observation in reference to Coleridge. Mr. Row says, — 
“ Coleridge endeavoured to draw a distinction between the reason and 
the understanding.” 
I assume that Mr. Row differs from that course of procedure 
Rev. C. A. Row. — No, I only used that as an illustration. 
Mr. Poyer. — But I think, in justice to Coleridge, it should be stated that 
he gives great reason for the distinction which he draws ; for he uses reason 
as the intellectual faculty, judging according to sense, while the under- 
standing is limited to sense not so emancipated or allied to the higher 
faculty of faith or of moral reason. Then I come to the discussion raised 
with respect to limits — whether we can or cannot know, whether we do or 
do not know, the infinite. That discussion has been pursued at some length, 
as Mr. Row tells us, by Dean Mansel in one of the celebrated Bampton 
Lectures, and also more recently by Mr. J. S. Mill, in his review of Sir 
W. Hamilton’s Philosophy. The subject is full of difficulty ; but when we 
are told by Dean Mansel, who follows Hamilton and applies certain negative 
